The Relationship Among Financial Institutions, Safeguards and Hydroelectric Dams in the Amazon by Juelsgaard, Amy
The University of San Francisco 
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke 
Center 
Master's Projects and Capstones Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects 
Spring 5-15-2020 
The Relationship Among Financial Institutions, Safeguards and 
Hydroelectric Dams in the Amazon 
Amy Juelsgaard 
amyjuels@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone 
 Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Juelsgaard, Amy, "The Relationship Among Financial Institutions, Safeguards and Hydroelectric Dams in 
the Amazon" (2020). Master's Projects and Capstones. 1013. 
https://repository.usfca.edu/capstone/1013 
This Project/Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and 
Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Master's Projects and Capstones by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital 
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu. 
  
This Master's Project 
 
 
 
The Relationship Among Financial Institutions, Safeguards and Hydroelectric Dams in the 
Amazon 
 
 
by 
 
 
Amy Juelsgaard 
 
 
 
is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of: 
 
 
 
Master of Science 
in 
Environmental Management 
 
 
 
at the 
 
 
University of San Francisco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:      Received: 
 
 
...................................………..    ................................…………. 
Amy Juelsgaard    Date   Stephanie A. Siehr, Ph.D.      Date
 i 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ ii 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ v 
1. Introduction and Research Questions ................................................................................. 1 
2. Background ....................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Significance of the Amazon .......................................................................................................3 
2.2 Infrastructure in the Amazon ....................................................................................................7 
2.3 Environmental and Social Safeguards ...................................................................................... 12 
3. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 15 
3.1 Policy Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 15 
3.2 Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 16 
4. Policy Analysis ................................................................................................................. 17 
4.1 Evolution of safeguards through World Bank .......................................................................... 17 
4.2 Traditional approach versus country systems approach ........................................................... 23 
4.3 Comparison of safeguards by financial institution ................................................................... 25 
5. Case Studies .................................................................................................................... 28 
5.1 Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador ......................................................................................... 28 
5.1.1 Project location ......................................................................................................................................... 28 
5.1.2 Project history ........................................................................................................................................... 29 
5.1.3 Social and environmental impacts of the project ..................................................................................... 35 
5.1.4 Analysis of CHEXIM’s compliance with social and environmental items .................................................. 38 
5.2 Belo Monte Dam in Brazil ....................................................................................................... 40 
5.2.1 Project location ......................................................................................................................................... 41 
5.2.2 Project history ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
5.2.3 Analysis of BNDES compliance with social and environmental items ....................................................... 51 
5.2.4 Social and environmental impacts of the project ..................................................................................... 53 
6. Discussion and Conclusions .............................................................................................. 58 
6.1 Traditional Approach Bests Country Systems Approach ........................................................... 60 
6.2 Safeguards Futile Without Implementation ............................................................................. 61 
6.3 National Development Banks Take Over ................................................................................. 62 
7. Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 63 
8. Literature Cited ................................................................................................................ 67 
 ii 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Map of South America showing the location and outline of the Amazon biome in 
yellow and basin in blue ................................................................................................................. 4 
Figure 2. Global maps showing species richness (biodiversity) levels for different categories of 
species: birds, mammals and amphibians ...................................................................................... 5 
Figure 3. Map depicting the major rivers and tributaries in the Amazon ...................................... 6 
Figure 4. Map depicting the current and planned dams in the Amazon and their location relative 
to protected areas and indigenous territories ............................................................................... 8 
Figure 5. Image showing the deforestation caused by a hydroelectric dam in the Brazilian 
Amazon ......................................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 6. Graph showing the amount of loans granted by the various types of financial 
institution and the specific banks in 2013 in USD billion ............................................................. 12 
Figure 7. Graph showing the global outward foreign direct investment stock from four emerging 
economies in USD billion .............................................................................................................. 20 
Figure 8. Timeline outlining the events related to the evolution of environmental and social 
safeguards at the World Bank ...................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 9. Map of the location of the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and the surrounding protected 
forests and protected areas .......................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 10. Timeline of major events related to the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam ............................... 34 
Figure 11. The environmental and social impacts caused by the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in 
Ecuador ......................................................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 12. A photo showing the power lines cutting through protected Amazonian forest ....... 36 
Figure 13. Map showing the location of Belo Monte Dam and the surrounding indigenous 
territories ...................................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 14. Photo of Tuira, a Kayapo woman, and the President of Eletronorte, Jose Lopes Muniz, 
at the Meeting of Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu in Altamira .................................................. 43 
Figure 15. Timeline of major events related to the Belo Monte Dam ......................................... 50 
Figure 16. The social and environmental impacts caused by the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil ...... 54 
Figure 17. Photo depicting deforested wood for the construction of the Belo Monte Dam ....... 56 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. The benefits of environmental and social safeguards for different stakeholders involved 
in development. ............................................................................................................................ 13 
Table 2. Percentages of each type of land cover at the project site during specific years 
throughout the project cycle of the Belo Monte Dam ................................................................. 58 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
List of Acronyms 
AFD: Agence Francaise de Developpement 
ANEEL: National Agency for Electrical Energy in Brazil 
BNDES: Brazilian Development Bank 
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CaDB: Caribbean Development Bank 
CAF: Development Bank of Latin America 
CDB: China Development Bank 
CELEC: Corporacion Electrica del Ecuador 
CHEXIM: China Export Import Bank 
CONELEC: National Electricity Council in Ecuador 
CNEC: National Consortium of Consulting Engineers in Brazil 
CNPE: National Council on Energy Policy in Brazil 
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIB: European Investment Bank 
ENARSA: Energia Argentina 
IBAMA: Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
IBRD: International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank 
IESS: Social Security Institute of Ecuador 
IFC: International Finance Corporation 
IIC: Inter-American Investment Corporation 
INECEL: Ecuadorian Institute of Electricity  
KfW: KfW Development Bank 
MEER: Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy in Ecuador 
US EXIM: Export Import Bank of the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
Abstract 
Since 2015, the Amazon experienced an infrastructure boom with more than $70 billion in 
infrastructure projects planned in the coming years. Large-scale projects have resulted in 
detrimental environmental and social impacts in the region over the last fifty years. This paper 
uses policy analysis and case studies to examine the evolution of financial institutions and their 
safeguards over time and how this evolution has affected the environmental and social impacts of 
hydroelectric dams in the Amazon. The case studies of two hydroelectric projects, the Coca 
Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador and the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil, highlight that the dams 
caused extensive environmental and social damage, including deforestation, loss of biodiversity, 
displacement and loss of livelihoods, among others. The safeguard approach of the financial 
institutions in these cases had little effect at mitigating the impact of the dams, demonstrating 
that the evolution of safeguards over time has not resulted in less environmentally and socially 
harmful hydroelectric projects in the Amazon. Financial institutions with minimal safeguards, 
mainly the national development banks from Brazil and China, have emerged as dominant actors 
in the region with little concern for the consequences of their financing. In order to protect this 
vulnerable ecosystem, governments of Amazonian countries should not develop any more large-
scale hydroelectric dams and the Brazilian and Chinese national development banks should 
implement their own safeguards in order to approve new projects for funding. 
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1. Introduction and Research Questions 
This research examines the relationship between economic development and environmental 
conservation. Government officials often voice the need to develop their economies even if that 
means negatively affecting the environment and local communities in the process, such as the 
Interoceanic Highway in Peru and the Santo Antonio Dam in Brazil, both of which caused 
extensive deforestation, loss of biodiversity, displacement of people and a spike in illegal 
activities. This research challenges the development argument put forward by many politicians 
by looking at the base of economic activity – infrastructure – specifically, hydroelectric dams in 
the Amazon.  
Infrastructure is meant to boost national and local economies and provide public services. 
However, many infrastructure projects have caused severe environmental and social damage and 
failed to provide the economic and public services for which they were built. One way to 
mitigate the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects is through safeguards, 
which are policies, standards and procedures used to determine and minimize environmental and 
social risks of projects. Financial institutions, such as the World Bank, apply safeguards as 
conditions to the project finance lent to borrower governments. Although the safeguards of 
multilateral development banks have become more stringent over the years, infrastructure 
projects in the Amazon have continued to move forward with grave consequences for the 
surrounding environment and communities.  
My main research question is: How has the evolution of safeguards of financial institutions 
affected the environmental and social impacts of hydroelectric dams in the Amazon? Ultimately, 
this research analyzes if the stringent safeguards within multilateral development banks has 
mitigated the environmental and social impacts of hydroelectric dams in the Amazon, or created 
an opportunity for new investors, such as national development banks, with minimal safeguards, 
to finance the riskiest projects – resulting in negative environmental and social effects. My sub-
questions are: 1) Are certain safeguard approaches of financial institutions more effective than 
others at mitigating environmental and social impact? 2) Is the substance of the safeguard itself 
the critical aspect to mitigate impact or is it the implementing partner of the safeguard? and 3) 
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How prominent have national development banks become vis a vis multilateral development 
banks in the Amazon and what has been the result of their emergence on the financing scene? 
I hypothesize that because multilateral development banks have strengthened their safeguards so 
much, borrower countries are turning to investors with the weakest safeguards, mainly the 
national development banks from China and Brazil, to acquire funding for hydroelectric dams. 
These new alliances are resulting in large-scale and long-lasting negative impacts in the Amazon 
both environmentally and socially. 
Considering the push for more infrastructure projects in the region, it is critical to understand 
how to mitigate their environmental and social impacts in order to keep this unique ecosystem 
intact. It is also important to understand if dams are truly serving their purpose of providing 
economic and public services, or if alternatives, such as energy efficiency or solar power, are 
preferable. Currently, safeguards are one of only a few tools to protect the environment and local 
communities from damage caused by infrastructure, which includes increased deforestation, 
water contamination, the loss of aquatic biodiversity, etc. As such it is vital to examine how they 
have changed over time and who all of the actors are to provide recommendations for reduced 
impact from hydroelectric dams in the Amazon. 
This report begins with detailed background on the significance of the Amazon region by 
highlighting its rare characteristics, such as its high levels of biodiversity. It then touches on the 
rise of infrastructure in the region, particularly hydroelectric dams, and the impacts of such 
projects on the surrounding environment and local communities. This section also introduces the 
concept of environmental and social safeguards. Following the background, the report outlines 
the methodology used to complete the research: policy analysis and case studies. In the policy 
analysis, the research follows the evolution of safeguards through the first financing entity to 
design and implement them, the World Bank. This section presents the two main approaches to 
safeguards – traditional and country systems – and ends with a comparison of the safeguards of 
the nine financial institutions providing loans in Latin America. The report includes two case 
studies – the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador and the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil – and 
provides information on the project overview and location, project history, environmental and 
social impacts caused by the project and the financial institution’s compliance with 
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environmental and social items. To finalize the report, there is a section on discussion and 
conclusions with an analysis of the findings followed by recommendations stemming from these 
findings.  
2. Background 
Chapter two provides a literature review with information on the significance of the Amazon 
rainforest by describing each of the elements that makes this ecosystem unique. It also gives 
detailed information on infrastructure in the Amazon and outlines the specific environmental and 
social impacts caused by hydroelectric dams. The section describes the funding landscape of 
these large-scale projects and notes the shifting in finance from multilateral institutions to 
national development banks. The chapter ends with a background on environmental and social 
safeguards, starting by defining safeguards and then noting their advantages. 
2.1 Significance of the Amazon 
The Amazon formed over 30 million years ago and today is the world’s largest tropical forest 
(Burnham et al. 2004). Spread across eight countries - Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela and one territory, French Guyana, - the legal boundaries 
of the Amazon are approximately two times the size of India at more than 6.5 million kilometers 
squared (Da Silva et al. 2005). Figure 1 depicts the location of the Amazon in South America 
outlining its boundaries to give a sense of the size of the region, some 40% of the continent. The 
Amazon houses the greatest amount of biodiversity in the world, home to 10% of all known 
plants and animals. For over 11,000 years indigenous groups have inhabited the Amazon 
(Roosevelt et al. 1996). Today the basin is home to over 35 million people, including 400 
indigenous groups. It is one of the last places on the planet where isolated tribes live, with an 
estimated 100 uncontacted groups (Amazon Conservation Association 2020). The Amazon 
stores twenty percent of the world’s freshwater and has a fundamental role in the global and 
regional climate cycles. This unique regions stores 150-200 billion tons of carbon making it a 
vital tool for solving climate change (Nobre et. al 2016).  
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Figure 1. Map of South America showing the location and outline of the Amazon biome in yellow and 
basin in blue.  
Source: World Wildlife Fund 
Renowned for its forests and rivers, one-tenth of the planet’s flora and fauna is found in the 
Amazon, higher than any other ecosystem. Figure 2 shows global maps depicting species 
richness for all birds, mammals and amphibians with the largest amounts in red. The figure 
highlights the extensive biodiversity found in the Amazon with at least 40,000 plant species, 427 
mammals, 1,294 birds, 378 reptiles and 427 amphibians in total (Da Silva et al. 2005).  Each year 
over 100 new species are discovered (Amazon Conservation Association 2020). Currently, 
roughly 2.1 million square miles of the Amazon is forested, and these forests contain close to 
half of all trees in tropical forest areas worldwide (Crowther et al. 2015), with an estimated 
16,000 different species of trees (Steege et. al 2013). Between 3,500-5,000 species of fish are 
found throughout the Amazon’s plethora of rivers (Andersen et al. 2018).  
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Figure 2. Global maps showing species richness (biodiversity) levels for different categories of species: 
birds, mammals, and amphibians.  
Source: Jenkins et al. 2013 
The Amazon plays a fundamental role in global water cycles. The Amazon watershed and river 
system is 2.3 million square miles and one-fifth of global freshwater is stored within this system 
(Latrubesse et al. 2017). The Amazon River is the largest tributary to the planet’s oceans and has 
over 1,100 tributaries running over 4,000 miles (Pedersen 2016). Figure 3 presents a map of the 
major rivers in the Amazon. Four of the world’s ten largest rivers are in the Amazon, including 
the Amazon, Negro, Madeira and Japura rivers. This vast network of rivers transfers sediments 
and solutes across vast distances, resulting in the world’s largest floodplain and over 1,000,000 
kilometers squared of wetlands (Latrubesse et al. 2017). Over 90% of sediments in the Amazon 
River come from a source in the Andes demonstrating the connectivity of the river network 
system (Anderson et al. 2018).  
The Amazon rainforest helps regulate climate cycles, such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, 
and rainfall patterns in the region (Lawrence & Vandecar 2015). Twenty-two billion tons of 
water is released from soils to the atmosphere on a daily basis through the process of 
evapotranspiration. Close to 50% of the region’s rainfall is produced by evapotranspiration from 
the forest (Salati et al. 1979). The Amazon forces large-scale circulation patterns in the 
atmosphere and produces aerial rivers. This allows the Andes Cordillera to drive cloud formation 
and rain, resulting in maximum rainfall over the western Amazon (Figueroa & Nobre 1990). 
These atmospheric patterns and aerial rivers create rainfall in the Andes for tropical glaciers, 
paramos, punas and yungas and supply water for major cities, including Bogota, Quito, Lima and 
La Paz. Over two-thirds of South America’s gross domestic product is produced in areas that 
receive rain produced by the Amazon (Nobre 2014). 
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Figure 3. Map depicting the major rivers and tributaries in the Amazon.  
Source: Myster 2017 
The Amazon represents a fundamental tool to combat climate change by absorbing 2 billion tons 
of the carbon each year, which represents 5% of global emissions (Amazon Conservation 
Association 2020). Overall, the area stores over 150 billion metric tons of carbon – 
approximately a decade’s worth of human-caused global emissions (Brienen et al. 2015). 
However, experts predict that due to current threats the Amazon will convert from one of the 
world’s most critical carbon sinks to a carbon source.  
The Amazon’s waters and forests are of vital importance to the economy of South America. 
Despite this crucial ecosystem, over 75 million hectares of forest - about 17% of the Amazon – 
has been lost since 1978 due to a variety of activities, including agriculture, mining and 
infrastructure. The rate of deforestation has increased, reaching a new peak in 2017. This 
deforestation threatens the integrity of the system and experts warn that the Amazon could be 
nearing a tipping point, which they estimate at 20-25% total deforestation, in which the rainforest 
would turn to a fire-prone, dry savanna (Lovejoy & Nobre 2018).        
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2.2 Infrastructure in the Amazon 
Infrastructure in the Amazon has had direct negative effects on the project sites and surrounding 
areas, such as increasing deforestation and threatening aquatic biodiversity, as well as indirect 
effects, including greater land speculation and illegal mining. There is a clear link between 
infrastructure projects, mainly hydroelectric dams and roads, and deforestation. Yet despite the 
evidenced damage of the sector, the Amazon is currently experiencing an infrastructure boom 
with more than $70 billion in infrastructure projects planned in the coming years (Ray et al. 
2018). This surge in infrastructure has been associated with large environmental impacts. From 
2000-2015 there were 27 infrastructure projects in the Amazon out of a total of 60 projects 
financed by development banks. Since 2015, 58 new projects have been completed or had 
financing approved, and 46 of them are in the Amazon. Most of these projects are in the Andean 
nations - Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia - due to the presence of the Amazonian headwaters in these 
countries. Investments from the countries’ GDPs in infrastructure have more than doubled in 
Peru, Bolivia and Colombia from 2008-2015 (Ray 2018). Much of the development bank lending 
in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia has been for highway construction and improvement, as well as 
hydroelectric dams (Ray et al. 2018). 
Governments argue that dams are needed for economic development and to lower carbon 
emissions (Latrubesse et al. 2017). Hydroelectric energy is touted as clean and necessary to meet 
sustainable development goals, including combating climate change. It is the largest source of 
renewable energy across the globe, comprising 71% of renewables as of 2016 (Moran et al. 
2018). However, the global hydropower field has changed over time with more dams being 
removed in North America than built these days. Most new hydropower projects are taking place 
in developing countries, including those spread across the Amazon, which is currently 
experiencing a boom in hydroelectric projects. There are over 4,000 dams in operation, planned 
or currently under construction within developing countries across Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, with the majority in the Mekong and Amazon (Moran et al. 2018). Figure 2 shows the 
current and planned dams in the Amazon and depicts how some of these are in protected areas 
and indigenous territories. More than 140 dams have already been built in the Amazon and there 
are 160 dams in various stages of planning (Andersen et al. 2018). These numbers are almost two 
times higher than what was originally reported for dams in operation or under construction. Peru 
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has the highest number of current and proposed dams of the four Andean Amazon countries 
(Andersen et al. 2018). Sixty-five of planned dams are in Brazil, and the country is also investing 
in developing hydropower resources in Bolivia and Peru in order to export the majority of the 
energy produced back home (Moran et al. 2018). Hydroelectric power represents 75% of Brazil’s 
energy and Brazil is the second largest producer of hydropower (Fearnside 2017). 
 
Figure 4. Map depicting the current and planned dams in the Amazon and their location relative to 
protected areas and indigenous territories.  
Source:  Anderson et al. 2019 
Advocates of these projects tend to overestimate the economic benefits. Despite the narratives 
that governments in the Amazon use regarding the benefits of dams to help them garner public 
support, these large-scale projects cause both environmental and social impacts, especially in 
developing countries. According to a study done by the World Bank, large energy and 
infrastructure projects are 37% more likely to cause serious environmental and social risks in 
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developing countries (Gallagher & Yuan 2017). The environmental impacts include disturbance 
of river ecology and river fragmentation, loss of aquatic and terrestrial biodiversity and habitat, 
deforestation and the release of substantial greenhouse gases, including methane. 
River connectivity is critical in the Amazon, but hydroelectric dams break apart this vital system. 
Dams prevent sediments and nutrients from moving downriver affecting the productivity of fish, 
which play an important role in the ecosystem health and local livelihoods (Anderson et al. 2018; 
Fearnside 2017). Hydroelectric projects also block fish migrations, such as the well-known 
catfish – dorado – which travels 3,000 miles from the mouth to the headwaters of the Amazon 
River to spawn and is slowly disappearing as a result of dams (Andersen et al. 2018). There are 
many other examples since large numbers of fish in the Amazon are migratory. Additionally, the 
interruption of river connectivity causes changes in seasonal flood dynamics, reduced water 
quality and increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (Castello & Macedo 
2016). 
Satellite images are used to trace the impacts of hydroelectric projects on the surrounding forest 
and demonstrate that trees are cleared for the construction of the dam and reservoir instillation. 
Figure 5 provides a visual of such destruction. For example, the perimeters of infrastructure 
projects financed by development banks in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia demonstrated a tree cover 
loss over four times the average loss in comparable areas without projects in these countries from 
2000 to 2015 (Ray et al. 2018). In addition to the dam itself and the reservoir instillation, roads 
built to reach the dam and along the transmission lines cause further deforestation (Finer and 
Jenkins 2012). Additionally, more deforestation from dams occurs indirectly from the displaced 
populations, people moving to the area to work and new roads that spring up within the affected 
region (Fearnside 2017). Specialists estimate that deforestation in the Amazon will increase by 
950,000 hectares by 2032 as result of 12 dams to be constructed on the Tapajos River in Brazil 
(Barretto et al. 2014).  
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Figure 5. Image showing the deforestation caused by a hydroelectric dam in the Brazilian Amazon.  
Source: Villas-Boas et al.  2015 
This deforestation in tropical forests, such as the Amazon, can cause areas to switch from carbon 
sinks to carbon sources. Furthermore, hydroelectric dams in the tropics exacerbate climate 
change by emitting up to 2-3 times more emissions than traditional fossil fuels, including gas, oil 
or coal plants (Barro et al. 2011). Methane is released as a result of the decomposition of plants 
below the surface of the dam’s reservoirs. Tropical dams are associated with higher amounts of 
methane emissions and additionally, new roads are typically built surrounding the dams, causing 
more deforestation and carbon losses to the atmosphere (Fearnside 2012).             
The social impacts of hydroelectric dams include displacement of people, alteration of people’s 
livelihoods, and impact on the food systems, water quality and agriculture near them. The World 
Commission on Dams produced a report which showed that 40-80 million people have been 
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displaced as a result of dams (VanCleef 2016). Freshwater fisheries along with floodplain 
agriculture and riparian forest products serve as one of the main sources of income for the 
Amazon’s inhabitants (Andersen et al. 2018). However, dams greatly reduce the fish stocks in 
the affected waters which in turn impact the local communities who are dependent on those 
resources. For example, as a result of the Tucuruí Dam in the Brazilian Amazon, the fish catch 
immediately declined by 60% affecting 100,000 people living downstream (Moran et al. 2018). 
In addition, naturally occurring mercury in the soil transforms into a poisonous methyl form due 
to the lack of oxygen in reservoirs, which then contaminates the food chain. Local communities 
who feed on the fish in these areas have unhealthy levels of mercury in their bloodstream 
(Fearnside 2017). Dams in developing countries serve large industries and urban populations 
rather than the surrounding communities, who in many cases do not even have access to the 
power generated from the nearby project and end up paying higher electricity bills. 
Even before accounting for negative social and environmental impacts, the actual construction 
costs of large dams are too high to yield a positive return (Ansar et al. 2014). Due to largely 
ignored environmental and social costs resulting from dams, the price of dams is so high that 
most do not have a return on investment (Latrubesse et al. 2017). In fact, in the majority of cases 
the costs of large dams are 96% higher than predicted costs. For example, the social costs of 
recent hydroelectric dams in the Amazon resulting from community displacement, water 
contamination and labor conditions are between $2.1 and $10.5 billion, none of which was 
included in the predicted costs (Ray et al. 2018). 
Multilateral institutions, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) financed many large-scale projects in the 1990s. Their financing continued in the early 
2000s, but over time these multilateral development banks switched their focus to 
environmentally sustainable and small-scale projects reducing the amount of funding available to 
developing countries for bigger projects. Their funding declined even more after the global 
financial crisis in 2008. As a result, national development banks from developing countries, such 
as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM), 
have stepped in to fill this funding gap (Vallejo et al. 2018). Figure 6 shows the total amount of 
financing from each multilateral and national development bank as well as the export credit 
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agencies in 2013 with China and Brazil both lending more than the World Bank and IDB 
combined. 
 
Figure 6. Graph showing the amount of loans granted by the various types of financial institution and the 
specific banks in 2013 in USD billion.  
Source: World Resources Institute 2015 
BNDES began overseas investment in 2009 and from 2009-2011 its overseas commitments were 
over US$1 billion. It is the largest development bank in Latin America by far and an important 
development partner both for the region and Brazil’s own domestic projects. In addition to 
BNDES, the infrastructure boom in the Amazon is characterized by an increasing role of Chinese 
banks in financing projects. Since 2007 China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export 
Import Bank (CHEXIM) have become the largest annual lenders in Latin America (Gallagher & 
Yuan 2017). The region has therefore seen a shift in its funding sources from the multilateral 
institutions in the twentieth century to national development banks, especially Brazilian and 
Chinese, in the twenty-first century.  
2.3 Environmental and Social Safeguards 
A few tools to mitigate the negative environmental and social impact of infrastructure projects 
exist. Governments throughout the world have enacted national legislation to prevent 
unnecessary harm to their citizens and the environment. Financial institutions have created 
safeguards as conditions of loans to borrowing countries. Lastly, implementing companies have 
developed codes of conduct to follow throughout the lifecycle of an infrastructure project 
(Dammert 2018). In large part these tools came about in response to campaigns by communities 
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affected by projects, partnering with global non-governmental organizations, over the last several 
decades (Gallagher & Yuan 2017). 
Larsen and Ballesteros (2013) define a safeguard as “a rule or institution that helps ensure that 
investments meet minimum social, environmental and governance standards”. Environmental 
and social safeguards aim to mitigate damage to the environment, minimize social conflict and 
avoid unethical behavior that can result from projects by presenting a set of regulations, 
monitoring and reporting procedures to guide recipient countries. As such, they benefit a variety 
of stakeholders and help reduce costs that could come about from significant issues - 
environmental or social – stemming from the project. Table 1 outlines the various benefits of 
safeguards for different stakeholders. In theory, the right safeguards can help meet the timeline 
of a project, achieve the economic aims of the project, and strengthen the capacity of 
participating stakeholders when applied and enforced.  
Table 1. The benefits of environmental and social safeguards for different stakeholders involved in 
development.  
 
Source: Gallagher & Yuan 2017. 
In general, there are three buckets of environmental safeguards, including pollution prevention, 
biodiversity and natural habitats, and climate change mitigation. Within social safeguards there 
are four areas of concern, which are the rights of indigenous peoples; involuntary resettlement of 
people; labor, health, and safety; and cultural heritage. Each financial institution determines 
which areas to cover as part of the safeguards. The way the safeguards system is designed to 
work is through a five-step process: 1) The safeguards anticipate the social and environmental 
risks and impacts; 2) The safeguards draw up plans to avoid and/or mitigate the risks; 3) The 
safeguards manage the implementation of the plans; 4) The safeguards monitor the 
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implementation; and 5) The safeguards respond to challenges that arise (Larsen & Ballesteros 
2013). Safeguards are intended to serve as an accountability mechanism. They are often seen 
negatively by borrowers for being costly and onerous and positively by civil society 
organizations for creating protective measures to prevent harm.         
Governments often need institutional capacity assistance to successfully implement these 
safeguards, as well as accountability tools to ensure the safeguards are met. For development 
banks operating abroad, the project governance and responsibility is shared between the host 
country and bank. Development banks can employ the safeguards via policies at various phases 
of the project cycle, including the initial screening, the due diligence prior to approval, the 
approval decision itself and monitoring throughout project completion (Ray et al. 2018). The 
recipient government can employ safeguards through national laws and regulations via 
government agencies, legislative bodies or judicial systems (Larsen & Ballesteros 2013). 
While several financial institutions have their own safeguards, governments also enact national 
legislation to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects. Many of 
the countries in the Amazon basin have developed regulations to protect both the environment 
and respect the rights of communities over the last two decades. In the case of Ecuador and 
Bolivia, both countries have constitutions that highlight the role of the federal government in 
ensuring environmental conservation and sustainable development. Ecuador’s constitution even 
recognizes the rights of nature itself. In 2008, Peru created its own Environmental Ministry, 
which plays an active role in mitigating negative impacts from infrastructure projects. 
Importantly, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela all ratified the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention of 1989. This states that indigenous communities have the right to “decide their own 
priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual 
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent 
possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development.” It calls on governments to 
“consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their 
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative 
measures which may affect them directly” (Art 6). 
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Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru have also signed the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly 
removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and 
fair compensation, and where possible, with the option of return” (Art. 10) (Ray et al. 2018). 
These policies must be followed by financial institutions with projects in countries which have 
ratified the declaration.         
3. Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to carry out the research. The research was 
conducted through a policy analysis and case studies of two hydroelectric projects in the 
Amazon: the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador and the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil.  
3.1 Policy Analysis 
My methodology includes a policy analysis of environmental and social safeguards. I begin with 
a review of the history and creation of safeguards at the World Bank. The World Bank was the 
first financial institution to implement safeguards and is considered the most influential for its 
impact in development finance field. The World Bank’s safeguards are considered the gold 
standard and many banks modelled their environmental and social frameworks after the World 
Bank. As such, I cover the evolution of safeguards at the World Bank starting in the 1980s and 
following events until present day analyzing how the extent and quality of the safeguards have 
changed over time. 
 
Due to a changing geopolitical context and the rise of emerging economies, such as China and 
Brazil, the approach to safeguards began to shift in the beginning of the 2000s with borrowing 
countries starting to criticize the stringent regulations of the World Bank. At this time a new way 
approach to safeguards emerges. I provide an overview of the two approaches to environmental 
and social safeguards: traditional and country systems. I explain what each one entails and 
compare the two of them. I provide a critical analysis of the different safeguards, highlightling 
the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
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I finish my policy analysis with a comparison of the safeguards of nine different financial 
institutions operating in Latin America today. These institutions can be grouped as such: 
multilateral development banks based in the North, developing countries’ national development 
banks, and sub-regional development banks. I note which safeguard approach (traditional or 
country systems) each financial institution uses. I discuss the environmental and social safeguard 
themes that each bank covers from pollution prevention to rights of indigenous peoples. In this 
comparison, I show the operation procedure requirements for the different institutions as well as 
which ones have accountability mechanisms. Bank transparency and information disclosure 
varies by financial institution and I cover which banks have these policies in their guidelines. 
Lastly, I cover which banks have an exclusion criteria to prevent certain risky projects from 
going forward.  
3.2 Case Studies 
My methodology also applies a case study approach to compare two hydroelectric dams in the 
Amazon that were financed by different banks: the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador and the 
Belo Monte Dam in Brazil. For each case study, I give an overview of the project and its location 
followed by a history of how the project came about. Multilateral development banks, including 
the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, originally agreed to finance both the 
Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and the Belo Monte Dam in the 1980s. However, once feasibility 
studies were concluded and protests broke out, the environmental and social risks became 
obvious, resulting in the banks declining financial support. With no funding available, both 
projects were put on hold for a couple of decades until new financial institutions came online 
from China and Brazil. China financed the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and Brazil financed the Belo 
Monte Dam. 
I provide detailed information on the social and environmental impacts of the dams on the 
surrounding environment and local communities. The variables I analyzed include deforestation, 
biodiversity loss, land cover change, disruption of river ecology and fragmentation, displacement 
of communities, health issues, loss of livelihoods, economic hardships, increased crime, and 
higher electricity bills. 
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In the case studies, I analyze how each of the financial institutions, the Export Import Bank of 
China (CHEXIM) and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), adhered to (or not) 
environmental and social safeguards throughout the lifecycle of the projects. In this part, I apply 
the policy evaluation component to assess if the safeguards succeeded or not. I critically discuss 
how well the financial institutions complied with their own policies and the national legislation 
of the borrowing countries as well as the subsequent consequences this had on both the 
environment and local communities.  
4. Policy Analysis 
Chapter four consists of the policy analysis of environmental and social safeguards. The section 
begins by looking at the emergence of safeguards within the World Bank, which was the 
dominant global financial institution in the twentieth century. Following the history of 
safeguards, the two approaches – traditional and country systems – are described and compared 
to one another. The section ends with a comparison of the safeguards of nine financial 
institutions currently lending to Latin American countries. 
4.1 Evolution of safeguards through World Bank  
Currently all international development banks operating in Latin America consider 
environmental and social concerns as part of their decision-making. However, before the 1980s 
there was no formal incorporation of these concerns in project finance. The World Bank and 
other lenders did not have their own safeguards and instead relied on the national legislation of 
borrowing countries.  
Some of the first progress in this area came about toward the end of the twentieth century. The 
1980s and 1990s mark the inception of environmental and social safeguards when local 
communities affected by projects partnered with global NGOs to pressure banks and 
governments to consider their concerns. For example, the World Bank financed the 1,500 km-
long Polonoroeste BR-364 highway in the Brazilian Amazon, and it resulted in deforestation, 
land conflicts, disease, and crime. In response, a large coalition formed and lobbied against the 
bank for the adverse social and environmental effects brought about by this project.  
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Environmental degradation and human suffering around the globe caused by large-scale projects 
financed by the World Bank, such as the Polonoroeste Highway and the Narmada Dam in India, 
and other multilateral development banks resulted in a large uprising of civil society 
internationally. Environmental and social activists worldwide lobbied for changes in multilateral 
development bank policies. As a result, the World Bank began to formulate its own safeguards in 
the 1980s, which took the form of an Operational Manual Statement on Environmental Aspects 
of the bank’s work published in 1984. This statement outlined the bank’s policies and procedures 
relating to projects and other components of its work that could affect the environment. 
Operational directives then replaced the Operational Manual Statements starting in 1987. Five 
years later, 11 operational policies and bank procedures, which provided protections for certain 
groups and resources, replaced the operational directives in 1992 (World Bank 2012). The 
safeguards focused mainly on the environment but included some social coverage. The World 
Bank also developed its own inspection panel for project-affected individuals to bring claims of 
non-compliance in 1993 (Dann & Riegner 2019). 
At the same time, the U.S. Congress passed the Pelosi Amendment in the early 1990s. This 
amendment required funders to review development projects’ potential environmental impacts 
and make environmental assessments available publicly. The U.S was a shareholder and funder 
of multilateral development banks, so this amendment led to restructuring the practices of 
international financial institutions (Dann & Riegner 2019).  
The World Bank’s initials safeguards spread into the laws and practices of other multilateral 
development banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, all of which modelled their standards on those of the World Bank. For example, 
the Inter-American Development Bank published statements with similar items to the World 
Bank’s operational policies in 1991 and its safeguard principles were codified in 1996. These 
banks developed accountability mechanisms too. Countries also began to adopt new laws 
influenced by the World Bank (Dann & Riegner 2019).  
Around the same time, in 1991, there was a public-private finance initiative between the UN 
Environmental Program and the private banking sector which ultimately led to the Equator 
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Principles in July 2006. These principles emulate the practices and guidelines of the World 
Bank; they can be adopted and applied to development projects costing more than $10 million 
USD on a voluntary basis (Gallagher & Yuan 2017). 
With the adoption of safeguards within the multilateral development banks, borrowing countries 
had to abide by both their own legislation as well as the policies of the banks in order to obtain 
and continue to receive funding. In the case that a borrowing country’s own law was not up to 
par with the bank’s norms, that country chose between forgoing the loan or raising its national 
standards. However, implementation of the safeguards fell solely on the borrowing countries and 
monitoring was difficult given the large number of projects. The global mobilizations also 
resulted in governments adopting a series of environmental and social safeguards. Many 
countries modeled their own laws on World Bank standards, including the environmental impact 
assessment. However, the adoption of safeguards has been slower and more difficult in 
developing countries (Dann & Riegner 2019).  
In 2005, the World Bank adopted a new approach of “use of country systems,” which allowed a 
borrowing country to utilize its own legislation if it was in line with the safeguards of the bank. 
However, this only applied to pilot projects under restrictive conditions of OP 4.01 
(Environmental Assessments) and was used very rarely due to the fact that most countries did 
not have such stringent policies (Dann & Riegner 2019).  
In 2012 the World Bank set out to reform its safeguards in part due to criticism the bank had 
received (Dann & Riegner 2019). World Bank borrowers commonly complain that 
environmental and social safeguards are strictly imposed without providing capacity-building 
components to the loans. They were deemed as bureaucratic, slow, costly, and too much of an 
imposition. Projects in Latin America going through the World Bank have an average approval 
time of 14 months and an estimated cost of 3% of the total project budget. A World Bank survey 
conducted with 100+ stakeholders showed that in Latin America 60% of initially proposed large-
scale projects were avoided by clients due to safeguard systems (Gallagher & Yuan 2017).   
At the same time, the economies of several developing countries, including the BRICS, began to 
grow increasingly and take a greater share of the global economy demonstrating more political 
influence within international finance. These countries mobilized domestic capital for investment 
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at home. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the World Bank and other multilaterals reduced 
funding. In their place, national development banks from China and Brazil emerged to fill this 
role. Figure 7 shows the increased financing provided by the BRICS countries from 1980-2013. 
For example, Brazil invested $10 billion in International Monetary Fund bonds during the 
financial crisis of the late 2000s. Also, the Brazilian Development Bank disbursed about $100 
million USD in 2010, while the World Bank disbursed $40 million USD the same year. These 
new large economies are creating their own approaches to development cooperation as well as 
environmental and social issues in an effort to resist the normative frameworks of the 
multilaterals. For example, Brazil, China and India promote a developmental state as opposed to 
the Washington Consensus-type development model and become development donors 
themselves. They underscore sovereignty in the relations with their borrowers, steering clear of 
intervention measures and instead providing an alternative to the strict conditionalities of 
traditional donors (Dann & Riegner 2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Graph showing the global outward foreign direct investment stock from four emerging 
economies in USD billion.  
Source: Zhou & Leung 2015 
The World Bank reforms took four years during which time intergovernmental negotiations and 
three public consultation rounds occurred. As part of the consultations rounds, the evaluators 
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spoke to government representatives, civil society organizations, indigenous groups, academia, 
and others on the various aspects of the new safeguards. Civil society organizations and donor 
states wanted to maintain the level of rigor of the original safeguards; whereas, borrower states 
wanted more flexibility for the implementation and more autonomy to use their own national 
legal systems. The reform resulted in a unified legal text, the Environmental and Social 
Framework, representing an integrated framework composed of a vision statement, an 
environmental and social policy and ten environmental and social standards. The vision 
statement is completely new. The environmental and social policy states the responsibilities of 
the World Bank and the environmental and social standards outline the obligations of the 
borrowers. Procedural rules regarding the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) now includes 
social impacts. The standards on land acquisition and resettlement, biodiversity, indigenous 
peoples carried over from the original safeguards with some modifications. The new standards 
include labor and working conditions, resource efficiency, environmental pollution, and climate 
change in addition to the health and security of project-affected communities. The World Bank’s 
new standards are not directly legally binding on the borrowing country but require that certain 
conditions be met before concluding a loan agreement. The safeguards then become legally 
binding once they are included in the loan agreements resulting in an Environmental and Social 
Commitment Plan. This is the same process as the original safeguards. The new framework was 
approved in August 2016 and went into effect in 2018 (Dann & Riegner 2019). Figure 8 shows a 
complete timeline of the World Bank’s safeguards. 
These updates make it much easier to replace some or all safeguards with the borrower’s national 
law. The participation of stakeholders is now required throughout the entire project cycle, 
including the implementation phase with these new safeguards. The borrower must also institute 
a project-based grievance mechanism. The big difference between these new safeguards and the 
original ones is that instead of following the policies of the World Bank, the borrowing 
government can use its own laws to manage the environmental and social impacts of a project 
(Gallagher & Yuan 2017). Another change is that the application of the framework can be 
different depending on who the borrower is by using the country systems approach. During the 
safeguard reform negotiations, China, India, Brazil and South Africa advocated the most for the 
use of country systems. Under the new safeguards, in order to use the country systems approach, 
the borrower’s standards need to have “objectives materially consistent with” the World Bank’s 
 22 
 
safeguards (Dann & Riegner 2019). Some may argue that national law in many countries can 
handle the impacts of the difficult projects better than 20 years ago due to the influence of the 
World Bank’s standards on the legal systems of the countries in which it financed projects.  
 
Figure 8. Timeline outlining the events related to the evolution of environmental and social safeguards at 
the World Bank. 
 Source: Author 
The World Bank’s dominance around the globe has started to wane as new players emerge from 
developing countries, especially China and Brazil. China’s outward foreign direct investment 
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increased from below $1.2 billion in 1990 to $94.6 billion in 2013 (World Resources Institute). 
Just in 2009 and 2010, China’s Export Import Bank and its Development Bank lent more than 
the World Bank did to developing countries around the world. Similarly, BNDES, the national 
development bank of Brazil, gives more loans in Latin America than the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank combined (Herbertson 2012). The development banks from 
China and Brazil rely on a very different approach to safeguards than the World Bank and other 
multilaterals in that they essentially defer to the legislation of the borrowing country and have no 
safeguards of their own.  
4.2 Traditional approach versus country systems approach 
Environmental and social safeguards across development banks range from a required set of 
international standards to total deference to the country systems of recipient nations. There are 
two principal approaches to safeguards: the traditional approach and the country systems 
approach, which is the terminology used in the literature (Larsen & Ballesteros 2013). In the 
traditional approach, the development bank has its own safeguards which must be followed by 
the bank and host country in order to receive funding. A lot of banks have safeguard policies if 
they are investing in developing countries to minimize the risk that their investments violate 
minimum social and environmental standards. Traditional safeguards have specific procedural 
and substantive requirements that must be followed by bank staff and borrowing governments in 
order to receive funding. Conversely, in the country systems approach, the development bank 
defers to the safeguards and institutions of the host country if they are as strong as those of the 
bank. Given the changing development finance scene, some lenders are now relying on the legal 
and institutional systems of the host country to implement more effective safeguard protections. 
Although the approaches are quite different, both of them rely on the host country for the daily 
implementation of the safeguards (Larsen & Ballesteros 2013).    
When safeguards first came about, the decisions surrounding investments at international finance 
institutions were greatly influenced by developed countries. The first approach to safeguards at 
this time was the traditional approach, which entailed detailed steps and procedures that must be 
followed by the borrowing government in order to minimize the environmental and social risks 
of development projects. This model was in place over the last several decades and has been 
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successful with specific projects in which the financial institution could mandate certain 
safeguards, such as environmental impact assessments, before construction started (Herbertson 
2012). Both dams and roads have had their impacts mitigated through application of the 
traditional approach. 
 
However, this is changing now with emerging economies (Brazil, China, India) making 
contributions to development finance, which has become more complex. As a result, recipient 
countries are advocating for more autonomy over the development process, including safeguards, 
and advocating for the country systems approach. New financial institutions are changing the 
way they provide funding to developing countries and how they apply safeguards. Several 
lenders offer funds in new and different ways to help promote more country ownership over the 
development process. One such prominent way is allowing borrowers to follow their own 
domestic rules and utilize their own local institutions to mitigate environmental and social 
impacts of development projects instead of requiring that they adhere to a strict set of procedures 
(Herbertson 2012).  
This new approach has both advantages and disadvantages. By allowing recipient governments 
to rely on their own safeguards, local laws and institutions can be strengthened resulting in more 
sustainable growth. However, this is more of a long-term process and in the interim, there is a 
high risk of poorer development outcomes if only the safeguards of the borrowing governments 
are used. Additionally, numerous countries do not have sufficient laws, enforcement ability, or 
even the political will to protect their own people and environment when it comes to 
development projects (Herbertson 2012). In some cases, costly delays and even total project 
shutdowns resulting from environmental and social issues can occur when relying solely on the 
country systems approach (Gallagher & Yuan 2017). On the other hand, the strictest standards 
are often criticized as greenwashing or for slowing down the project cycle or turning potential 
borrowers away from financial institutions with such standards.  
Previous experiences with use of country systems shows that national regulations and processes 
are not as protective as the World Bank standards. Also, there is no guarantee of effective law 
enforcement and compliance with rule of law principles within this approach. Today the World 
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Bank awards less environmentally risky projects due to its safeguards, which until recently 
followed the traditional approach. 
4.3 Comparison of safeguards by financial institution 
Across the variety of development banks operating in the region, including multilateral, national, 
and private-sector windows, there are different approaches to environmental and social 
safeguards. Multilateral development banks based in the North (World Bank, IDB) have 
strengthened their safeguards over time as described above and have the highest standards and 
strictest safeguards of all the financial institutions. This means that they have rigorous policies 
that must be followed by the borrowing country regardless of that particular country’s national 
standards. The conditions placed on their loans follow and aim for harmonized global standards. 
Within these banks, there are public-sector lending windows, such as the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which can offer concessional financing as well as 
grants to borrowers who struggle to meet the high standards (Ray et al. 2018).  
Conversely, developing countries’ national development banks have the lowest standards of all 
the financial institutions. These banks typically follow the standards used by borrowing 
countries, but they do not require that the countries meet these standards as a condition of the 
loan. In addition, national development banks do not offer assistance to help the borrowing 
countries meet their standards. Chinese development banks, such as the Export-Import Bank of 
China (Chexim), fall within this category and are largely deferential to host country standards 
(Ray et al. 2018). The other banks include: Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD), 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), China Development Bank (CDB), KfW Development 
Bank (KfW) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (US EXIM). The national 
development banks of China and Brazil have not applied safeguards to their loans abroad, except 
in very few cases. Instead, they follow the laws of borrowing countries and leave the 
environmental and social concerns under the management of the host government (Herbertson 
2012). 
Private-sector windows of the Northern-based multilateral development banks, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), fall in between 
multilateral development banks and national development banks in regard to their standards and 
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stringency of safeguards. The conditions they place on their loans also follow and aim for 
harmonized global standards. The difference between the private-sector windows and 
multilateral development banks is that the former does not offer assistance to borrowing 
countries to help them reach their own standards (Ray et al. 2018.) 
There are also sub-regional development banks, including the Development Bank of Latin 
America (CAF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CaDB). CAF is an important player in the region and has its own approach to safeguards. CAF 
defers to the national standards of the borrowing country and also offers concessional finance 
when needed for public-sector borrowers to meet their own standards (Ray et al. 2018). 
Environmental and social safeguards cover various themes, including pollution prevention, 
biodiversity/natural habitats, climate change mitigation, right of indigenous peoples, involuntary 
resettlement of people, labor/health/safety, and cultural heritage. The thematic coverage for 
environmental and social safeguards varies across the banks, but the main variation falls in two 
areas: climate change and labor/health/security. All of the banks, except for CHEXIM and CAF 
have included climate change within their safeguard policies. Similarly, most of the banks, 
except for the World Bank, IDB and CAF, cover labor/health/safety issues. Two banks, BNDES 
and CDB, do not mention themes they cover in environmental assessments (Gallagher & Yuan 
2017).  
Regarding operational procedure requirements for environmental and social safeguards, there are 
only two items which all of the banks follow. The first is that all of these banks require 
environmental impact assessments at the pre-lending stage, and the second is that all banks 
mandate that projects meet the environmental standards of the host country. The multilateral 
development banks (World Bank and IDB), as well as several of the national and sub regional 
development banks (US EXIM, EIB, AFD and KfW) require borrowing countries to comply 
with international standards through mandated safeguards. The five other banks defer to the host 
country rules. However, only three of the banks, including CAF, IDB, and IBRD offer 
concessional loans when needed to help borrowing countries meet those standards. The 
multilateral development banks and their private-sector windows, such as IFC and IIC, rely on 
their own standards, including prior consultation protections in all cases and grievance 
 27 
 
mechanisms in most cases. Over the last decade, multilateral development banks have also 
enacted the policy of free, prior, and informed consent of affected indigenous communities by 
mandating this as a required practice for approval of the loan (Ray et al. 2018). 
The multilateral development banks, sub-regional banks and three of the national banks include 
public consultations with affected communities in their environmental assessment. The two 
which do not are CDB and BNDES. Only three of all the banks have project-level grievance 
mechanisms: World Bank, AFD, and EIB. However, only two banks (World Bank and US 
EXIM) mandate independent monitoring and a review of environmental compliance, even 
though all of the banks have links between the compliance of environmental regulations and 
disbursement. All of the banks except for three, IDB, KfW and BNDES, require an ex-post 
environmental impact assessment. 
Bank transparency and information disclosure is also a critical component of safeguards. Seven 
of the banks have policies on transparency that allow all people to view the environmental 
assessments of specific projects. The World Bank and IDB have online databases that provide 
environmental assessment reports for each individual project. Conversely, CHEXIM, CDB, and 
CAF do not have such transparency and do not have an information disclosure policy. 
The World Bank’s safeguards are considered the gold standard and other financial institutions, 
including EIB, IDB, US EXIM, CaDB, KfW, and AFD have harmonized their standards with 
those of the World Bank. Alternatively, CHEXIM and BNDES developed their own guidelines 
to handle environmental and social concerns, but they do not have many requirements for their 
lending.  
Banks can implement an exclusion criteria in order to weed out the environmentally and socially 
risky projects from their funding. The IDB, CaDB, US EXIM, EIB, KfW, and AFD all utilize 
this type of criteria in addition to their environmental and social safeguards. Four of the banks, 
including CAF, BNDES, CDB, and CHEXIM, do not have an exclusion criteria. The World 
Bank uses its own policy on procurements and the “Multilateral Development Bank Harmonised 
Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the 
Employer” to exclude specific projects (Gallagher & Yuan 2017).  
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In sum, the multilateral development banks and Western national development banks have the 
highest standards required for all projects. Conversely, the developing country national 
development banks from Brazil and China offer the least amount of environmental and social 
protection by relying on the rules of borrowing countries with no monitoring for compliance 
system or assistance to support compliance. Between the two extremes are KfW, AFD, CAF, and 
CaDB, which include some international standards for the application of safeguards but in 
general employ a more flexible approach to safeguards.  
5. Case Studies 
This section continues with the analysis through two case studies: the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam 
in Ecuador and the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil. Both case studies begin with an overview of the 
hydroelectric project and its location in the Amazon, followed by a detailed history of the 
project. The case studies include the environmental and social impacts caused by the dams and 
an analysis of the financial institutions’ compliance with safeguards.  
5.1 Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador 
The Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project is Ecuador’s largest hydroelectric dam. The dam 
became operational in November 2016 and runs at only 50% of its estimated 1,500 MW capacity 
(Vallejo et al. 2018). The total cost of the dam came in at $2.8 billion USD, with eighty percent 
of the costs financed by the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM). Ecuadorian laws were 
disregarded by both government officials and CHEXIM to move the project forward, resulting in 
devastating consequences for the environment and local communities. 
 
5.1.1 Project location  
 
The Coca Codo Sinclair dam lies within a heavily forested area of the Ecuadorian Amazon on 
the Coca River within the Napo River watershed (Vallejo et al. 2018). There are several 
protected areas, including the UNESCO Sumaco Biosphere Reserve, within the area of influence 
of the dam, which totals close to 40,000 hectares (Lopez). Although there are no indigenous 
territories in this region, there are numerous traditional communities. The project is also close to 
an active volcano, El Reventador, which has erupted continuously over the last decade. Figure 9 
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provides a map of the region showing the location of the dam and the surrounding protected 
areas and forests as well as the volcano.  
 
Figure 9. Map of the location of the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and the surrounding protected forests and 
protected areas.  
Source: Vallejo et al. 2018 
5.1.2 Project history  
 
Plans to construct a dam in the region began in the 1970s with initial studies on the hydro-
energetic potential of the Napo River Watershed. The prefeasibility study was concluded by 
HIDROSERVICE in 1976 and the feasibility study by Italian consultants and the Ecuadorian 
Institute of Electricity (INECEL) in 1992. Using the registered flow calculations from 1972-1990 
as their base, the results of the studies suggested a project close to 1,000 MW operating capacity 
with two units. Although the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) had originally agreed to 
finance the dam, it backed out once feasibility studies concluded in 1992 due to the dam’s 
proximity to the active Reventador Volcano. The project was considered too risky given the 
volcano’s eruption in 1987 and the impact it could have on the structural integrity of the dam and 
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power lines (Vallejo et al. 2018). With no funding, plans for the project were put on hold for 
several decades. 
 
Rafael Correa became the the President of Ecuador in 2007 and brought with him a new vision 
for the country. A self-declared socialist, Correa despised the western-backed development 
institutions and looked to China to bring in investment to finance his lofty goals. During the first 
year of his presidency, he created Ecuador’s 2007 Master Electrification Plan, which aimed to 
replace energy generated from fossil fuels with hydroelectric energy in order to achieve self-
sufficient renewable energy production. Although, the plan also intended to import additional 
energy from Peru and Colombia (Power Technology). Ecuador’s Master Electrification Plan 
aspired to have one of the cleanest energy matrices in the world through the construction of eight 
dams (all financed by China), including Coca Codo Sinclair (Garzon). As a result of this plan, 
President Correa declared Coca Codo Sinclair a priority and placed it under the responsibility of 
the National Electricity Council (CONELEC) to move it forward. This dam in particular was 
expected to supply 44% of Ecuador’s electricity needs. 
 
That same year, the government of Ecuador created the Ministry of Electricity and Renewable 
Energy (MEER) in July 2007 to promote the project under the leadership of Minister Alecksey 
Mosquera. Additionally, President Correa issued Executive Decree 655 in October 2007, which 
stated that at the request of the Board and Executive Director of CONELEC, he could declare 
high-priority electric projects in special areas (protected areas) if they had feasibility studies 
done already (Lopez 2008). Coca Codo Sinclair was one such high-priority project. 
 
Instead of conducting a new feasibility study, the 1992 feasibility studies were redesigned to 
reach 1,500 MW (twice the original amount) with a run-of-river design using flow from the San 
Rafael Waterfall in the preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA was 
conducted between September 2007-March 2008 by Entrix, the contractor of Termopichincha, 
Ecuador’s state-owned power company in charge of the project (Lopez). The redesign 
overestimated water availability in the region to power the dam since it was based on 
hydrological data close to thirty years old (Teravainen 2019). The dam’s former general 
manager, Luciano Cepeda, declared that top Ecuadorian officials pushed ahead not wanting to 
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waste time with a new study (Casey & Krauss 2018). Despite the outdated data used, the 
preliminary EIA was approved in one week by CONELEC in the beginning of April 2008. This 
one-week approval represented a record approval time by this government agency. 
President Correa and the former Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez developed a joint 
venture between Termopichincha and Argentina’s company, Energia Argentina (Enarsa), in 
April 2008. This resulted in the creation of Compania Hidroelectrica Coca Coda Sinclair S.A. 
(70% owned by Termopichincha and 30% owned by Enarsa). At the same time, MEER 
promoted the dam in the affected region. MEER’s strategy to reduce any local opposition to the 
dam was to make the mayors of the two municipalities surrounding the project site – El Chaco 
and Gonzalo Pizarro – deal with the demands of local inhabitants. To do so, they separately 
signed two cooperation agreements between MEER and the municipal government of El Chaco 
in January 2008 and the municipal government of Gonzalo Pizarro in February 2008 (Lopez 
2009). The agreements outlined goals to educate the local population, build a health center, and 
improve cooperation across the various governance institutions.  
 
While MEER was working at the local level through the agreements with the municipal 
governments, Termopichincha continued managing Coca Codo Sinclair by working to hire a 
consultant to elaborate and socialize the terms of reference of the definitive EIA. They hired 
Entrix, who with Coca Codo Sinclair S.A., held public consultations in the affected region after 
local residents and local governments pressured them to do so. As part of this process, they 
presented the terms of references of the definitive EIA to community members in El Chaco and 
Lumbaqui from May-June 2008. In the beginning of October 2008, Coca Codo Sinclair S.A. 
announced the bidding of the definitive EIA. 
 
President Correa inaugurated the construction of the project on April 29, 2008 in the Simon 
Bolivar compound of the Gonzalo Pizarro municipality to the surprise of local residents who 
learned that the project had an eight-month old contract with a private construction company, 
FOPECA S.A., already. This demonstrated unusual speed in public contracting processes and 
non-compliance with the environmental licensing processes. The construction was to build an 
access road to the power station, and it never had an EIA conducted or environmental license 
granted even though the road went through a protected area and Ecuadorian law requires an 
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environmental license before construction can begin. Construction started in May 2008 and since 
the government had declared the dam a national priority, no one could do anything to stop it 
(Vallejo et al. 2018).   
  
At the time of the initial construction, the advocates of the Coca Codo Sinclair dam did not know 
of the agreements between MEER and the municipal governments. They tried to get close to the 
local actors directly by promising to employ the locals in the projects. The local populations and 
municipal governments demanded an EIA, environmental license, and monitoring system of the 
project.  
 
A comprehensive assessment of the entire project never occurred and instead two separate EIAs 
took place: one for the dam and one for the power lines. The definitive environmental impact 
assessment on the dam was conducted by Efficacitas, a consulting firm, in 2009. It was 
submitted mid-2009 along with the environmental management plan to retain the environmental 
license. Basic activities, such as biological monitoring and chemical changes in the system, were 
never covered in the EIA or other plans. Although the Reventador Volcano had been erupting 
continuously since 2002 and the project site is close to a large geological fault line that was the 
epicenter of a 6.9 earthquake in 1987, the contingency plans in the EIA related to seismic and 
volcanic risks were unclear (Vallejo et al. 2018). There were no public consultations or social 
participation involved in the process. Previously, they had created a commission of workers in 
the Ministry of Environment from the central plant to follow up on the project, excluding the 
regional workers from Napo and Sucumbios, who were responsible for the local protected areas 
(Lopez).  
 
With the EIA approved, Hogan & Hartson, a law firm based in Washington D.C., prepared the 
bid documents for the project in 2009. That same year, Ecuador started negotiations with 
Sinohydro Corporation, a Chinese construction company, which gave the government access to 
Chinese financing (Vallejo et al. 2018). The Ecuadorian government went to the Export-Import 
Bank of China (CHEXIM) for financing and the bank agreed to support both the dam and the 
transmission lines (Ray et al. 2018). Importantly, the deal between China and Ecuador required 
that Ecuador hire a Chinese construction firm as the general contractor. As a result, the 
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engineering, construction and procurement contract was awarded to the Sinohydro-Andes JV 
consortium in October 2009. This consortium consists of Sinohydro (89%), the Ecuadorian 
company Coandes (8%), the Chinese consulting company Yellow River Engineering (1.5%), and 
the Italian consulting company Geodata (1.5%). At the same time, in September 2009, Argentina 
sold its share of the joint venture to Ecuador for $5.5 million USD (Teravainen 2019). 
  
The cost of the project increased to $2.8 billion USD, triple the estimate provided by a study 
completed by the Federal Electricity Commission of Mexico. In May 2010, the government of 
Ecuador signed a contract with CHEXIM for $1.683 billion USD with 6.9% interest rates over 
15 years (Vallejo et al. 2018). CHEXIM provided 85% of the total costs and the remaining funds 
came from the Ecuadorian government using both debt (63%) and equity (37%). The interest 
alone costs Ecuador $125 million annually. As a result, almost 80% of Ecuador’s oil exports, key 
to the country's economy, are sent to China to repay loans for at least five years (Kliman et al. 
2019).  That same year, the state-owned company Coca Codo Sinclair EP was established for the 
project’s development and Coca Codo Sinclair S.A. was transferred to the national government 
of Ecuador within the state-owned company Corporación Eléctrica del Ecuador (CELEC) 
(Teravainen 2019). 
 
Construction on the dam began in August 2010 and lasted for six years. More than 14,000 people 
were hired during construction. Twenty percent of the manual labor consisted of foreigners 
(mainly Chinese), while 40% were hired from the area of influence even though Sinohydro 
promised to hire 70% during the process to inform the public about the project. There were no 
incentives or trainings offered to local residents so they could provide services to Sinohydro 
(Vallejo et al. 2018). Additionally, when work on water intake and transmission lines was 
underway, community monitoring was assigned to Coca Codo Sinclair S.A., creating a conflict 
of interests. Even though Ecuador has laws to ensure transparency in public administration, there 
was almost no available information on the environmental audits and work supervision was 
completely restricted (Vallejo et al. 2018). After six years of construction, the Coca Codo 
Sinclair Dam came online in November 2016. Figure 10 provides a timeline of major events 
throughout the development of the dam.  
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Figure 10. Timeline of major events related to the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam.  
Source: Author 
Investigations into the project have resulted in various criminal charges demonstrating that 
corruption played a critical role in the advancement of the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam. Close to all 
the high-level Ecuadorian officials involved in the dam’s construction, including the previous 
vice president, a former electricity minister and ironically, the anti-corruption official monitoring 
the project, are in jail or sentenced on bribery charges. The later was exposed by a recording in 
which he discussed Chinese bribes. Ecuador’s previous president, Rafael Correa, who prioritized 
the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam from the beginning of his term, fled the country and lives in exile in 
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Belgium after being found guilty of accepting funds from companies for his election campaign in 
exchange for contracts (Casey & Krauss 2018). Although the environmental and social risks of 
the dam were obvious and voiced repeatedly, a web of corruption allowed the project to move 
forward to completion.  
 
5.1.3 Social and environmental impacts of the project  
 
The area of influence of the dam includes protected areas, including reserves, protected forests, 
and national parks. The Coca Codo Sinclair dam caused damage to the surrounding environment 
through deforestation, aquatic biodiversity loss, increased sedimentation, and reduced water 
flow. The social impacts have affected thousands and include loss of livelihoods and economic 
hardships as well as serious issues regarding the occupational health and safety of the project’s 
workers. Figure 11 provides a consolidated view of all the impacts caused by the dam.  
  
 
Figure 11. The environmental and social impacts caused by the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam in Ecuador.  
Source: Author 
The impacted area extends over 40,000 hectares directly affecting 2,000 people. The 
environmental damage includes sedimentation, reduced fish stocks downstream, and reduced 
water flow, including at the San Rafael waterfall (Ray et al. 2018). Sedimentation has increased 
 36 
 
upstream while the water flow below the dam has reduced significantly impacting fish stocks. 
The San Rafael Waterfall, the tallest in Ecuador, has essentially gone dry as a result of the dam 
(Power Technology). Silting is also a large problem in the reservoir, which is currently overrun 
by bushes and trees. 
 
Figure 12. A photo showing the power lines cutting through protected Amazonian forest.  
Source: Casey & Krauss 2018 
A total of five protected areas have been affected by Coca Codo Sinclair with an impact on flora 
and fauna, especially within the Sumaco Biosphere Reserve and the Cayambe-Coca National 
Park (Teravainen 2019). New roads to reach the site of the project have caused deforestation in 
the Sumaco Biosphere Reserve (Power Technology). As shown in Figure 12, the transmission 
lines affect several protected areas, including the Cayambe-Coca National Park, the Antisana 
Ecological Reserve and the protected forests of La Cascada and the Tigre River (Vallejo et al. 
2018). Lastly, in order to pay back the Chinese loans, Ecuador has increased its oil exploration in 
the Amazon, cutting deeper and deeper into the forest, including Yasuni National Park, leading 
to even more deforestation (Garzon). 
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The social impacts resulting from Coca Codo Sinclair include employment challenges, unsafe 
working conditions in the construction sites, loss of livelihoods, healthcare and sanitation, and 
economic hardships. Since there are no indigenous territories in the region, a formal process of 
free, prior and informed consent did not occur. Communities living in the area represent small-
scale farmers and fishermen. As part of the socialization process carried out by the dam’s 
representatives, local residents were promised employment and other economic opportunities for 
small businesses to provide food, lodging, and other services to construction workers arriving in 
the area. Importantly, the project’s representatives did not make any exact commitments to these 
promises and did not follow through with them. Instead of hiring local residents, the company 
brought workers from other parts of Ecuador denying employment to those in the area. Many in 
the local communities also borrowed money to create and increase businesses, for catering and 
restaurants, for lodging, etc. However, they were excluded from opportunities to sell their 
services to the project’s workers. This caused much social conflict and protests (Ray et al. 2018). 
 
The project promised to hire 4,000 people directly and 50,000 indirectly (Lopez 2009). 
Sinohydro stated that 70% of those employed to work on the dam would be hired from the local 
communities; however, they only hired 40% causing grave dissatisfaction. Near the end of 
construction, unemployment rose in the area of influence. Many people were unable to resume 
previous activities in the region, such as agriculture, due to the changing landscape (Vallejo et al. 
2018). 
  
Local residents also have to pay higher prices for electricity despite their proximity to the dam. 
The diverted water from the dam has dried out parts of the Coca River for months affecting the 
fish stocks. As a result, fishermen’s livelihoods and recreational activities on the Coca River 
have been damaged. In addition, flooding caused by the water released from the dam disrupts 
farming downstream and has even drowned some farmers (Kliman et al. 2019). 
  
There were substantial social impacts for the workers themselves as well. Construction workers 
filed 26 official labor complaints to the government of Ecuador by 2011. The complaints 
centered around the unsafe labor conditions. For example, in December 2014 a tunnel platform 
collapsed killing 13 workers (10 Ecuadorians, 3 Chinese). In addition, the workers received 
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unsafe drinking water and shower water, which resulted in an outbreak of typhoid fever and 
bacterial infections among the laborers (Teravainen 2019).  
 
5.1.4 Analysis of CHEXIM’s compliance with social and environmental items  
 
In 2004, CHEXIM created minimal environmental guidelines for its investments abroad. Four 
years later, the bank publicly disclosed more complete guidelines, which require the recipient 
government to complete an environmental and social impact assessment before approving any 
loan. The guidelines also mandate that open consultations with affected people be held and touch 
on managing resettlement issues. However, experts do not know if CHEXIM has also developed 
the necessary institutional framework to stand by their guidelines (Herbertson 2012). There are 
numerous issues with how CHEXIM applied social and environmental safeguards for Coca Codo 
Sinclair. The bank did not respect any of the safeguards required and practiced an extremely 
deferential approach to safeguards allowing the Ecuadorian government’s misdoings to go 
uncontested.  
 
For loan approval CHEXIM requires an environmental impact assessment, permits, and the 
approval of local environmental administrations. CHEXIM also claims to respect the rights of 
local communities to resources. CHEXIM requires public consultations for projects with 
significant negative impacts. Lastly, the bank requires an ex-post EIA after construction is 
completed (Vallejo et al. 2018). 
  
Although the original feasibility studies showed that the project was high-risk due to the 
proximity to an active volcano, Ecuador’s officials and CHEXIM chose to ignore them. At the 
time of the studies, environmentalists also pointed out that construction and operation of the dam 
would divert too much water, nearly drying out parts of the Coca River for months of the year, 
wiping out aquatic systems (Kliman et al. 2019). These environmental concerns did not deter 
Chinese funding. Additionally, CHEXIM did not require a comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment of the entire project looking at both the dam and the transmission lines. As such, 
there were two separate EIAs, one for the dam and one for the transmission lines, which does not 
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provide an accurate picture of the potential impact from the project as a whole. Other financial 
institutions, such as IDB, would have required a comprehensive EIA. 
  
One of the conditions of the loan in the contract with CHEXIM was that Chinese companies 
must be made the general contractor. This prevented open bidding and made oversight 
ineffective. A municipal oversight committee was tasked with the environmental monitoring of 
the dam from 2009-2011; however, halfway through construction, that monitoring became part 
of the contractor’s responsibilities. This represents a huge conflict of interest since the company 
performs its own environmental audits. As a result, the public has little access to the 
environmental reports since the company has not published them although it is required by 
transparency requirements (Ray et al. 2018). CHEXIM has continued funding despite the lack of 
compliance with environmental reporting. The bank has provided very little information and has 
prevented access to public information (Vallejo et al. 2018). There have been issues with 
transparency throughout the entire life cycle of the project. 
  
The dam’s environmental management plan includes labor safeguards, but these were ignored by 
Sinohydro and CHEXIM. Even the death of thirteen workers did not halt the bank’s financing. 
Two years passed between the accident caused by the company’s negligence and the dam 
coming online. In that time, the workers went on strike to demand safe labor conditions. Workers 
striked in 2011 and 2012. By the end of 2011, a total of 26 complaints were filed against 
Sinohydro in just the province of Sucumbios regarding work conditions. As a result of the 
complaints, the Ministry of Labor and the Social Security Institute of Ecuador (IESS) did 
inspections and fined Sinohydro $5,280 USD. The company then implemented corrective 
measures under the Ministry of Labor’s supervision. However, a special investigation approved 
by the Controller’s Office in 2013 found almost thirty instances in which Sinohydro failed to 
meet the required regulations for occupational health and safety (Vallejo et al. 2018). The 
typhoid outbreak and bacterial infections related to unsafe drinking water supplied at the 
construction site, combined with the deaths of several workers, resulted in protests that delayed 
work but had no impact on CHEXIM’s disbursements for the project.  
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Currently, there are many issues with the dam. Thousands of cracks in the dam’s machinery can 
be seen, including the distributors, which were imported from China (Casey & Krauss 2018). In 
October 2018, CELEC announced that three out of eight generation units were not operating 
because of major disconnections in the system. The dam can only work at full capacity for five to 
six months out of the year due to changes in water availability. In addition, there has been a 
shortage of energy caused by power cuts in the transmission lines that have affected many 
Ecuadorian cities. As result, two new dams (Minas San Francisco and Delsitanisagua) had to be 
developed to offset the energy shortage (Teravainen 2019). In essence, the dam is inoperable and 
provides no economic benefits (Kliman et al. 2019). Coca Codo Sinclair has had six orders of 
suspension, a termination warning and 92 labor claims representing its multitude of problems. 
The Minister of Electricity and Renewable Energy ordered two independent studies to assess the 
damage and Sinohydro’s contractual liability in June 2019. 
 
Although an ex-post EIA is required after construction is completed by both CHEXIM and 
Ecuador, there was never one conducted (Vallejo et al. 2018). This is a convenient fact given the 
enormous and myriad of issues resulting from the dam. Ecuadorian legislation is strong but 
difficult to execute, and in the case of the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, Ecuador failed as guarantor 
of safeguards while CHEXIM willingly participated in the various instances of non-compliance 
with rules and regulations. 
5.2 Belo Monte Dam in Brazil 
The Belo Monte Hydroelectric Project is the largest dam in the Amazon Basin, the fourth largest 
dam in the world and the largest infrastructure project undertaken in Brazil during the first 
decade of the 21st century. The dam became operational in November 2015 supplying 4.46 of 
the 11.23 GW originally estimated, a significant decrease due to climate variability and a small 
reservoir (Moran et al. 2018). This reduced energy output means more dams on the Xingu River 
are projected to be built to compensate. The total cost of the dam came in at $18.5 billion USD, 
with eighty percent of the costs financed by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). It was 
the largest investment in the history of the bank in Brazil (AIDA 2018). The project moved 
forward despite significant issues with the EIA and requests by technical experts to halt the 
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licensing process. As a result, the environmental and social impacts caused by the dam are 
extensive and long-lasting. 
 
5.2.1 Project location  
 
Belo Monte is located in the Xingu Basin of the Brazilian Amazon, an area known for its vast 
biodiversity and cultural importance. Covering 450,000 square kilometers, the Xingu Basin 
contains 29 indigenous territories which are home to 20,000 indigenous peoples and 28 ethnic 
groups. The Xingu River, a tributary of the Amazon River within the basin, flows from the south 
to the north and is of vital importance for the communities living in the Xingu (Garzon & 
Millikan 2014). Figure 13 shows the location of the dam and the surrounding indigenous groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 13. Map showing the location of Belo Monte Dam and the surrounding 
indigenous territories.  
Source:  The Guardian 2014 
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5.2.2 Project history  
 
Plans to construct a dam in the region began during the military dictatorship in the 1970s. During 
that time, the government power utility company Eletrobras funded a hydrographic study in the 
Xingu Basin and proposed the Belo Monte dam as part of a larger group of six dams along the 
Xingu River. The river’s “Big Bend” (“Volta Grande” in Portuguese) was the key feature of the 
Belo Monte site, which extends 140 kilometers and has a water level that rises and falls nearly 
100 meters depending on the season. The viability and environmental studies were carried out by 
the National Consortium of Consulting Engineers (CNEC), a consulting firm in Sao Paulo. As 
the studies were being conducted, the large Brazilian construction company Camargo Correa 
purchased CNEC. In 1985, field studies on environmental impacts commenced under CNEC 
which contracted universities and research institutions to carry out the work (Fearnside 2017).  
 
Eletrobras publicly released its “2010 Plan” in 1987, which included the six dams on the Xingu 
River. This generated strong opposition from indigenous groups in the region, including the 
Kayapo people. The Kayapo indigenous group dominates the middle and lower portions of the 
Xingu River. In 1989, they led the first major protest against the proposed dams. A large group 
of indigenous peoples opposed to the dams met in Altamira, Para over the course of five days. 
Figure 14 is a photo of an indigenous woman from the Kayapo group holding a knife up to the 
President of Eletronorte in protest of the proposed dam. This event gained attention around the 
world and resulted in repercussions for the project’s financing. Eletrobras had requested funding 
in the amount of $10-$20 billion USD from the World Bank and Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) to help finance the dam, but both banks decided not to fund the project due to the 
requests of the indigenous peoples and the serious opposition. With no available funding and 
Brazil’s inability to solely finance the projects, the proposed dams were shelved (Fearnside 
2017). 
 
Thirteen years later, during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 2002, Eletronorte (a 
subsidiary of Eletrobras) submitted a revised proposal for the dam along with two Brazilian 
construction companies (Camargo Correa and Odebrecht). The new design called for a run-of-
the-river design to divert 80% of the Xingu River. However, plans to move forward with the 
revised proposal did not happen until Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) became 
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President of Brazil in 2003. Lula stated his objectives to finish Brazil’s stalled infrastructure 
projects during the early days of his term, including the Belo Monte dam. As a result, the 
Brazilian Congress approved the legislative decree 788 in 2005, which granted permission to 
build the dam. This move violated Article 231 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 within the International Labour Organization Convention 
(ILO 169), which Brazil ratified in 1991, since consultation protocols with the affected 
indigenous groups were not carried out (Fearnside 2017). The project did not have a completed 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) when it was approved either. A civil lawsuit on this 
violation of the rights of indigenous peoples was brought by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s 
Office in 2006 and has yet to be heard in the Supreme Court (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The environmental impact and economic feasibility studies ramped up in 2005 and the findings 
were released two years later by Eletrobras, Camargo Correa, and Odebrecht. Given the proposal 
to divert a majority of the river and the ensuing drought, many groups who depended on the river 
Figure 14. Photo of Tuira, a Kayapo woman, and the President of Eletronorte, Jose Lopes Muniz, at 
the Meeting of Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu in Altamira.  
Source: Garzon & Millikan 2014 
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for their survival, including indigenous peoples, riverine communities, fishermen and other local 
populations, were concerned with the proposed dam and the social and environmental risks it 
represented. For example, water quality and transport as well as the number of fish would all be 
impacted causing the region to become uninhabitable and forcing the indigenous groups to move. 
The Kayapo and other indigenous groups voiced their concerns regarding the project, including 
the fact that they were not consulted, during the Second Meeting of Indigenous Groups in the 
Xingu in June 2008. One month later, the National Council on Energy Policy (CNPE) approved 
Resolution 6, which confirmed that Belo Monte would be the only large hydroelectric dam to be 
built on the Xingu River (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
As part of the necessary legal processes the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), which was created in 1989 and took over responsibility 
for licensing processes and vetting the EIA, organized public hearings with the indigenous 
groups in September 2009 to discuss the environmental impact assessment done on Belo Monte 
(Fearnside 2017). However, there were multiple problems with how these hearings were carried 
out. The EIA, more than 20,000 pages, was only shown to the affected communities two days 
before the public hearings between the state and the local communities. It was presented in 
Portuguese and there was no translation for people whose native language was not Portuguese. 
Overall, there were not sufficient public hearings and they were not done in the right locations 
where the majority of the most threatened populations could participate (Garzon & Millikan 
2014). In addition, many police and military were present during the public hearings intimidating 
the indigenous peoples. The indigenous participants left early to demonstrate that they had not 
been consulted (Fearnside 2017).  
  
That same month, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) announced its plans to finance the 
project despite the fact that the preliminary license had not been granted. At the same time, an 
independent panel of specialists delivered a technical report to IBAMA. The report “Critical 
Analysis of the Environmental Impact Study of Belo Monte” identified grave problems and 
serious gaps in the EIA. Nevertheless, the Brazilian government pressured IBAMA to approve 
the preliminary license. In November 2009, a team of environmental analysts at IBAMA 
produced a technical report arguing against the approval of a preliminary license, stating they did 
 45 
 
not have enough time to analyze what came out of the public hearings in September as well as 
issues related to the indigenous groups due to pressure from the government (Garzon & Millikan 
2014).  
 
Despite the concerning statements in the technical report, the President of IBAMA issued the 
preliminary license number 342/2010 for Belo Monte on February 1, 2010. The director of 
IBAMA’s licensing sector was replaced before the preliminary license was granted. Two days 
before, the technical team at IBAMA issued technical note 04/2010 stating, “there are not 
enough elements to certify the project's environmental viability.” The preliminary license 
resulted in a Basic Environmental Plan and included 40 preconditions that needed to be met 
before an installation license could be granted. These included the construction of schools and 
health posts and monitoring the quality of water and fish, among other items. As such, IBAMA 
adopted a practice of inserting preconditions into the license representative of gaps in the EIA. 
The first condition required the project developer to establish a robust monitoring plan on the 
impacts to water quality, alluvial vegetation, ichthyofauna, turtles, fishing, navigation, and ways 
of life of the population in the affected area within the first six years of the dam’s operation 
(Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
 
On April 20, 2010 Brazil’s National Agency for Electrical Energy (ANEEL) held the auction for 
the Belo Monte dam despite the various civil lawsuits filed by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and civil society organizations. The lawsuits centered on the irregularities with the 
concession of the preliminary license and the fact that Eletrobras had not complied with the 
mandatory preconditions of the license, including the protection of indigenous peoples and their 
territories. Only two consortiums participated in the auction. Norte Energia, S.A. won the bid in 
partnership with various Brazilian construction companies. Shortly after the auction, the 
construction companies left the consortium due to fear associated with the financial risks of the 
project and the desire to preserve their financial assets. In their place entered the state-owned 
companies of Eletrobras, pension funds and other state-controlled investment funds (Garzon & 
Millikan 2014). The construction companies still bid for portions of the construction works since 
they were guaranteed payment regardless of how much energy the dam generated. The Chief 
Executive Officer of one of the construction companies, Camargo Correa, confessed to paying 
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$30 million reais to two Brazilian political parties to obtain construction contracts. Other 
companies, including Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez, later revealed the bribes they made for 
Belo Monte contracts as well (Fearnside 2017). 
  
In March 2010, various social movements in Altamira handed an extrajudicial notice to BNDES 
warning the bank about the issues with the preliminary license. Citing the Brazilian Constitution 
and the National Environmental Policy Law (Law 6,938/81), the document stated that the bank 
would be liable for the costs of the social and environmental impacts of the project if it financed 
Belo Monte. The Chief of Staff to the President of BNDES responded to the notice on April 22, 
2010 saying that the bank did not know the specifics of the project (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
In September 2010, Norte Energia presented a letter to BNDES requesting long-term financing 
for Belo Monte. Three months later, the President of BNDES Luciano Coutinho, announced that 
the bank would finance the project. In January 2011, the report “Mega-project, Mega-risks: 
analysis of risks for investors in the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex” was released by two 
non-governmental organizations (Amigos da Terra - Amazonia Brasileira and International 
Rivers) and delivered directly to BNDES in an attempt to discuss the content. However, the 
organizations never received a response (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
BNDES announced the approval of its first loan to Norte Energia for $1.087 billion reais to 
advance actions for the implementation of Belo Monte, even though the consortium did not have 
an installation license for the project. In response, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Para State 
requested information from the bank regarding the analysis and approval criteria it used for its 
financing. They also asked what the first loan would be used for and what the bank thought about 
the legality of a partial installation license. The bank responded saying they did not believe it 
was necessary to have a technical analysis phase on the economic viability of the project, both in 
terms of the cost of the project as well as the cost to mitigate social and environmental impacts 
and provide compensation. They stated that the first loan would be used to pay the suppliers for 
equipment and materials as well as service providers for the project and for implementation 
studies. The conditions on the loan included the creation of a non-intervention obligation at the 
site of the dam until the installation license was issued. BNDES stated that in the event that the 
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social and environmental conditions were not upheld, the long-term financing contract would be 
able to suspend disbursements until the situation improved (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
On January 12, 2011 the President of IBAMA resigned so that he did not have to sign the 
installation license. The Interim-President of IBAMA signed the partial installation license (LI 
770) on January 26, 2011 facing pressure from the government’s electricity sector. The 
following day, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Para State filed a civil action lawsuit against the 
irregular concession of the partial installation license; partial licenses do not exist under 
Brazilian law. In response, Federal Judge Ronaldo Desterro suspended the partial installation 
license in March 2011. However, several days later, the President of TRF-1, Judge Olindo 
Menezes, signed a Security Suspension (an instrument allowing judicial decisions to be reversed 
if they could bring harm to public order, health, security, and the economy) at the request of 
Brazil’s Attorney General. This move invalidated the injunction and allowed work on the Belo 
Monte project to continue based on the partial installation license (Fearnside 2017). In April 
2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States 
requested that the Brazilian state halt all activities until indigenous peoples were properly 
consulted.  
  
On June 1, 2011 the President of IBAMA signed the installation license number 795/2011 
allowing the work on the dam to begin even though only 5 of the 40 preconditions had been met. 
Five days later the Public Prosecutor’s Office from Para State filed a new civil lawsuit requesting 
three items: 1) the installation license be annulled, 2) Norte Energia comply with all of the 
preconditions of the preliminary license before requiring a new installation license and 3) 
IBAMA refrain from issuing a new installation license until Norte Energia complied with the 
preconditions of the preliminary license (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
Despite all of this, BNDES signed the contract for the first bridge loan to Norte Energia for $1.1 
billion reais on June 16, 2011. Construction of the dam began a week later. BNDES received its 
second extrajudicial notice regarding its financing in October 2011 signed by more than 170 civil 
society organizations. The notice included information on the serious issues with the project’s 
licensing, the violation of the rights of indigenous peoples, the various civil lawsuits brought by 
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the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the project’s deviation from the legal framework of financing 
institutions as well as the environmental and social responsibility guidelines of the bank. BNDES 
provided a generic response on November 16, 2011 (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
At the time, seven surveys carried out by IBAMA technicians confirmed that Norte Energia had 
not complied with the conditions of the environmental license and even reported false 
information. In January 2012, the IBAMA staff recommended sanctions on Norte Energia and a 
month later IBAMA applied a $7 million reais fine on the company for not complying with the 
environmental license conditions (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
Despite these events, the Director of BDNES approved the second bridge loan to Norte Energia 
in the amount of $1.8 billion reais in February 2012. However, this second loan was not publicly 
divulged by BNDES when it was approved and was only discovered in May 2012 through a 
formal request for information that International Rivers issued using the new access to 
information law 12.527/2011 (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
In November 2012, BNDES announced its approval of a $22.5 billion reais loan package for 
long-term financing of the Belo Monte dam. The package broke down as such: 1) a loan directly 
to Norte Energia in the amount of $9.8 billion reais, 2) an indirect loan in the amount of $9 
billion reais using two pass-through agents (Caixa Economica Federal for $7 billion reais and 
BTG Pactual for $2 billion reais), and 3) another loan directly to Norte Energia in the amount of 
$3.7 billion reais to buy equipment. This represented the largest loan in the bank’s history (it still 
is) and covered about 80% of the project’s total costs estimated at $28.9 billion reais. BNDES 
charged 4% annual interest on a 30-year loan. Some of the terms in the loan were not provided 
by other financial institutions, including payment in installments for 30 years. BNDES also gave 
an unusual series of loan extensions and allowed other modifications to the terms after the first 
development loan was granted to the dam consortium (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
On December 4, 2012 an open letter signed by the Coordinator of the Xingu Vivo Movement 
and nearly 70 organizations was delivered to BNDES headquarters calling out the extensive list 
of irregularities and economic, legal, and social-environmental problems of Belo Monte. The 
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letter requested that the President of BNDES not grant the financial package announced the prior 
week. However, two weeks later the President of BNDES signed the package for long-term 
financing of the project (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
On September 10, 2015 IBAMA’s technical staff issued a formal opinion listing a series of 
conditions that were still pending before an operating license could be issued. Nevertheless, the 
operating license was granted in November 2015 allowing the reservoirs to be filled despite the 
fact that the precautionary measures to protect indigenous peoples in the region filed by the 
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in 2011 had not been met. The reservoir was 
filled in December 2015 and shortly after the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights 
Opened a case against Brazil for human rights violations (Fearnside 2017). The violations 
include the absence of consultation and FPIC of affected indigenous groups, the lack of 
participation and adequate assessment of environmental impact and the forced displacement of 
thousands of people (AIDA 2018).  Figure 15 provides a timeline of major events related to the 
Belo Monte Dam.  
 
Corruption played a large role in the development of the Belo Monte Dam. “Operation Car 
Wash,” an investigation launched in 2014 by the Federal Police of Brazil, revealed the largest 
graft scheme in the history of Lain America. For years company executives at the Brazilian oil 
company Petrobras took bribes made by Brazilian construction companies and awarded contracts 
at inflated prices in return. Secret funds were created to store and channel the illegal payments to 
politicians from numerous political parties who had appointed the Petrobras executives. In many 
cases the funds financed political campaigns and aimed to keep political groups in power. 
Billions of dollars have been paid illegally and politicians and executives at the highest levels 
have been charged in the scheme, including the former president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva (Watts 2017). As the investigation has gone on, it has come to light that this type of scheme 
occurred in other sectors as well, including the electricity sector. Brazil’s Central Accounting 
Office initiated an audit focusing specifically on Belo Monte and found that the price of the dam 
was inflated by $3.384 billion reais (TCU 2016). The investigation found that throughout the 
development of the Belo Monte Dam, politicians received payments from the construction  
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Figure 15. Timeline of major events related to the Belo Monte Dam.  
Source: Author 
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companies to approve the project despite the strong evidence against building it (Moran et al. 
2018).  
 
5.2.3 Analysis of BNDES compliance with social and environmental items  
 
BNDES’ involvement with Belo Monte started at an advanced phase of the planning and 
licensing of the project. The bank approved its first loan after the technical studies had already 
been conducted by the electric sector of the government and its partners in the private sector and 
after the preliminary license had been granted by IBAMA. Given its late entry to the project, 
BNDES’ ability to influence the design of the dam was minimal (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
  
However, there are numerous issues with how BNDES applied social and environmental 
safeguards for Belo Monte. The bank relies solely on a final and unappealable judicial decision 
to guide its operations, providing opportunities for the misuse of the Security Suspension and the 
violation of human rights and environmental legislation. BNDES does not have an operational 
policy regarding free, prior, and informed consultation with indigenous peoples and other 
traditional populations affected by enterprises. The bank’s safeguard approach is to follow the 
national legislation of the borrowing country. Since Brazil ratified ILO 169, by not carrying out 
consultations with indigenous peoples, the bank did not abide by the country’s law on this matter 
(Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
BNDES did not carry out risk and feasibility analyses for the first two bridge loans, which 
conflicts with current banking rules. The bank also ignored its own internal regulations in 
releasing the funds without an evaluation of economic viability and social and environmental 
risks (Fearnside 2017). Belo Monte would not have been constructed if they had conducted a 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis or followed recommendations from the World Commission on 
Dams. In fact, the economic analysis done demonstrated a high likelihood, 72% chance, that the 
costs of the dam would be greater than the benefit (Moran et al. 2018). Social and environmental 
costs resulting from damages were also not factored into the project when BNDES analyzed the 
financing. Due to the protests, costs to participating firms and banks totaled US$1.4-5 million 
per day of delay. 
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The only parameter used by BNDES within the contract to analyze the environmental regularity 
of the project and thereby approve funding and continue disbursements was the existence of the 
installation license. The bank did not concern itself with the degree of compliance with the 
conditions of the installation license or the preliminary license as demonstrated by the long-term 
financing contract. As long as the installation license was not suspended, the bank was satisfied 
regardless of Norte Energia’s performance on social-environmental items. This means that only 
the cancellation of the license could have affected the disbursements of the loan according to the 
contract. The anticipatory conditions were not realized because the loan contracts required that 
the installation license be obtained in order to release the funds (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
BNDES relies on technical reports done by Norte Energia and IBAMA to monitor the project’s 
execution, including its compliance with the conditions of the environmental license. However, 
IBAMA did not have the capacity to responsibly monitor the project. As such, a clause was 
included in the contract with Norte Energia obligating them to hire an independent auditing 
group to monitor the social-environmental regularities of the project (AIDA 2018). Under Annex 
II of the main contract, it states that Norte Energia has to send BNDES quarterly (later reduced to 
every six months) and annual reports on the social and environmental requirements of the project 
and quantitative indicators of the human development in the municipalities affected by the 
project. Compliance with the social and environmental conditions needs to be proven via the 
reports sent each quarter by Norte Energia for the disbursements and use of the funds under the 
contract. Although the contract required an independent auditing group, the verification of 
compliance with the social and environmental obligations within the contract was self-reported 
by Norte Energia (Clause 13. III, h). The results of the audit have no contractual value and the 
contract does not allow for any legal action in response to reports produced by the audit. Clause 
20 of the main contract says that only the administrative or legal cancellation of the license can 
comprise the use of disbursed funds. Norte Energia only has to present reports, but the content 
does not matter (Garzon & Millikan 2014). 
  
In addition, the contract does not mandate that the social and environmental audit reports be 
disclosed publicly. In fact, BNDES claimed bank secrecy in order to withhold information on 
whether the auditing group had been contracted or not. The non-governmental organization 
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Instituto Socioambiental has been requesting the auditing reports from BNDES since July 2013 
using the access to information law, but the bank denied the request invoking bank secrecy 
(Villas-Boas et al. 2015). After three years of pressuring the bank, an extrajudicial agreement 
was reached between BDNES, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and Norte Energia requiring the 
latter to publish the reports produced by the auditing group on its website. 
  
The bank took a few measures to mitigate the environmental and social impacts of Belo Monte. 
BNDES announced that it would invest $3.2 billion reais for environmental and social actions, 
including the Basic Environmental Plan and to ensure compliance with other conditions of the 
environmental licenses. The bank also said the project would put $500 million reais into the 
Sustainable Regional Development Program for the Xingu with the goal of improving the 
regional population’s quality of life (Garzon & Millikan 2014).  
 
5.2.4 Social and environmental impacts of the project  
 
The Belo Monte dam caused significant and irreversible damages to the surrounding 
environment through deforestation, biodiversity loss, and land cover change. Social impacts, 
including displacement, higher crime and homicide rates, health concerns, and livelihood 
disruptions have touched upon thousands of people in the region. Figure 16 presents a 
consolidated view of all the impacts caused by the dam. The serious environmental and social 
irregularities in the project resulted in more than 60 lawsuits and at least 29 fines from IBAMA 
(AIDA 2018). Importantly, many of the ill effects are yet to be fully documented given the short 
amount of time between the dam coming online and now. 
 
The dam’s reservoir flooded more than 500 square kilometers of tropical forest and lowlands 
(Fearnside 2017). Over 40,000 people, including many indigenous groups, were displaced as a 
result. A total of 9,000 families were forcefully relocated (AIDA 2018). Close to 5,000 riverine 
communities and many indigenous peoples were forced to migrate to Altamira. Now these 
communities live far away from the Xingu River, which they depend on for their livelihoods, and 
have few alternative employment opportunities. With no public transportation from their new 
housing they have lost access to their fishing livelihood (Villas-Boas et al. 2015). 
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Figure 16. The social and environmental impacts caused by the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil.  
Source: Author 
The surge in Altamira’s population is not only due to the displaced communities, but also the 
more than 100,000 construction and service workers who moved there to find employment. 
Since construction work on the dam started in 2011, the population of Altamira increased from 
100,000 to 150,000 (Villas-Boas et al. 2015). This population growth is associated with higher 
crime and violence rates. In Altamira, the murder rate increased by 147% during the construction 
of the dam making it the deadliest city on the planet in 2015 (Prestera 2019). 
  
Local communities have also suffered from health issues. Given the disruption of their habitats, 
many indigenous peoples abandoned hunting and fishing. They turned to the consumption of 
processed food made available by the influx of people in Altamira. This dramatic shift in their 
diet has caused health problems. For example, malnutrition rates increased in children under the 
age of five across the indigenous territories. Child mortality for indigenous peoples in Altamira 
was four times higher than the national average of Brazil (Villas-Boas et al. 2015).  
  
Politicians promised to lift people out of poverty and provide important public services with the 
construction of Belo Monte. However, the local communities have borne the brunt of this ill-
conceived project. Many have been displaced, lost access to their livelihoods, witnessed 
 55 
 
increasing violence, buried loved ones, and have received no compensation in return. Their 
hardships have only increased. In fact, electricity bills for local communities went up instead of 
down, despite the fact that they live right next to the dam (Moran et al. 2018).   
  
The construction of the Belo Monte Dam is linked to increasing deforestation such that in 2011, 
deforestation in Brazil was highest around the dam’s surrounding area (Atkins 2018). Illegal 
logging exploded in protected areas and indigenous territories around the dam. Forests around 
Altamira were cut at a faster rate than anywhere else in the country as thousands of people 
moved in and forest degradation rates went up around the project site. Neighboring indigenous 
territories experienced increased deforestation due to the land value increase in the area. From 
2008-2013 deforestation inside indigenous territories located in the affected area of the dam was 
193.4 square kilometers, an increase of 16.31%. In 2013, the Cachoeira Seca Indigenous 
Territory had the highest deforestation of any indigenous territory in Brazil. The following year 
in 2014, 200,000 cubic meters of wood were extracted in the same indigenous territory - the 
equivalent of filling 13,000 logging trucks (Villas-Boas et al. 2015). Deforestation catalyzed by 
the dam spread extensively. Greenpeace linked illegal deforestation in indigenous reserves more 
than 200 kilometers away to the dam. 
  
Much of the illegally logged wood was sold to the construction workers on the dam site, which 
consumed a lot of wood as shown in Figure 17. Norte Energia bought large quantities of wood 
from external suppliers, which the environmental programs sought to avoid since most of the 
commercialized wood in the region is illegal. A good portion of the wood used for the 
construction rotted and was not reused as required by the Basic Environmental Plan (Villas-Boas 
et al. 2015). 
 
Burnings increased in indigenous territories and illegal roads were opened facilitating invasions. 
There was an increase in the illegal invasions by hunters and commercial fishers in three 
indigenous territories. Illegal mining in indigenous territories also increased. The forest 
degradation caused by the illegal logging and mining reduces biodiversity and creates a greater 
risk of fire. There is also great violence and intimidation used against the inhabitants by the 
illegal loggers. Even with the dire need for resources to protect these areas, close to 80% of the 
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environmental compensation funds from Belo Monte went to protected areas outside of the 
Xingu Basin (Villas-Boas et al. 2015). 
 
  
Figure 17. Photo depicting deforested wood for the construction of the Belo Monte Dam.  
Source: Villas-Boas et al. 2015 
Belo Monte has had an enormous impact on fish populations by destroying breeding sites and 
preventing migration. The project reduced 80% of the flow of the Xingu River to fill up the 
reservoir and in this process, many fish were trapped and suffocated. Due to inability to migrate, 
many fish have not been able to complete their reproductive cycles. The construction of the dam, 
explosions, excessive lighting, reduced water transparency and dredging drove away and killed 
many fish. A total of 63 species of fish have been threatened, including the pacu, a staple of 
indigenous peoples in the region. The damage to the fish is so severe that in April of 2016 
IBAMA fined Norte Energia $11 million for the death of over 16 tons of fish which could not get 
past the dam during migration (Moran et al. 2018). 
  
This loss of fish has made traditional fishing areas inviable. The surrounding indigenous 
populations have been impacted since they depend on the fish for their sustenance. Three 
indigenous groups in particular were left without the fish and turtle stocks they depend on 
(Fearnside 2017). Some of the most important species of fish for the indigenous peoples have 
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completely disappeared. Given the decreasing fish stocks, food insecurity has increased amongst 
these groups. In addition, traditional fishermen were forced to look for new fishing spots in 
indigenous territories and protected areas due to declining fish stocks from the dam. These areas 
were already being used by other people resulting in social conflict over user rights. The 
monitoring done by Norte Energia on fish stocks is based on fish weight and not on the loss of 
traditional fishing areas. The fishermen have tried to demonstrate the impact from these changes, 
but IBAMA has not responded to their concerns in more than two years (Villas-Boas et al. 
2015).  
  
Other taxonomic groups have been affected as well, including turtles. Turtles in the region face 
two new threats: poaching and inability to breed. The dwindling fish populations have resulted in 
an uptick of turtle poaching by local communities. This increased pressure is negatively affecting 
the turtles’ ability to maintain population numbers. The ability of the turtles to migrate for 
breeding has also been impacted by the dam. For example, the survival of the Arrau river turtle 
has been threatened since many of its breeding sites are close to the dam and the species need to 
migrate upstream to spawn but are no longer able to do so. As part of the EIA, Norte Energia 
committed to managing the breeding sites of the turtles but did not do so (Brenna 2016). 
  
There was significant change in the land cover as a result of the dam as depicted in Table 2. The 
total amount of primary forest in the region declined a total of 12.5% from 2006-2017. 
Secondary forest remained stable except for the period between 2008-2011 when it decreased by 
2% in the area. Belo Monte caused increased water along the canal in 2016-2017 and decreased 
water downstream. This decreased water downstream resulted in an increase of natural bare land 
along the river. Natural bare land had a small proportion in 2006 and increased in 2008 and 
continuously increased from 2015-2017. The agro pasture area increased before dam 
construction from 2006-2011 and then remained stable. The area of man-made bare land 
increased in 2015 due to construction of the canal, most of which was replaced with water in 
2016 due to completion and operation of the dam (Jiang et al. 2018). 
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Table 2. Percentages of each type of land cover at the project site during specific years throughout the 
project cycle of the Belo Monte Dam.  
 2006 2008 2011 2015 2016 2017 
Primary 
forest 
47.81% 44.21% 41.70% 38.28% 36.34% 35.31% 
Secondary 
forest 
16.01% 16.08% 13.99% 13.92% 14.09% 13.91% 
Agropasture 23.67% 27.25% 31.30% 31.23% 30.33% 30.39% 
Man-made 
bare land 
0.51% 0.52% 0.62% 3.49% 2.25% 2.52% 
Natural 
bare land 
0.85% 2.70% 2.31% 4.03% 5.03% 5.53% 
Water 11.15% 9.22% 10.08% 9.04% 11.96% 12.33% 
Source: Jiang et al. 2018 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This research aimed to answer the overall question of: how has the evolution of safeguards of 
financial institutions affected the environmental and social impacts of hydroelectric dams in the 
Amazon? The World Bank was the first financial institution to develop and implement its own 
safeguards. This took place at the end of the 1980s as a result of pressure put on the bank by 
international actors, including civil society organizations and project-affected individuals. The 
original safeguards of the World Bank followed a traditional approach – used by multilateral 
development banks – in that borrowing countries had to comply with the regulations of the bank 
following a step-by-step process in order to receive funding. In a case of non-compliance with 
the safeguards, funding could be withheld, thus creating an accountability mechanism. Other 
multilateral development banks, including IDB, modelled their safeguards off of those of the 
World Bank as the bank took on a global role – leader of normative frameworks within the 
development finance sector. Over time, the safeguards of the World Bank have come to be 
considered as the gold standard, cementing its position as the frontrunner in this space.  
 
Given the level of safeguards, it is reasonable to hypothesize that hydroelectric dams in the 
Amazon have seen improved results regarding their environmental and social footprint. Although 
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the multilateral institutions adopted rigorous safeguards over the years, this research found that 
this evolution did not result in less environmentally and socially harmful hydroelectric dams in 
the Amazon. In fact, there have been a multitude of projects, including Coca Codo Sinclair and 
Belo Monte, recently completed in the Amazon with devastating impacts on both the 
environment and communities. This is due to new actors within development finance that 
emerged in the mid-2000s, which utilize a different approach to safeguards stemming from 
dissatisfactions with their previous role as debtors to the multilateral institutions.  
 
Many borrowing countries had long complained that the safeguards of the World Bank were 
burdensome and costly. Although the global finance scene had traditionally been dominated by 
the World Bank, new players came onto the scene in the 2000s due to a changing global order. 
With booming economies, new emerging powers led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa, who had historically received financing from the World Bank, were able to create their 
own national development banks to provide credit domestically and internationally. These 
countries intentionally chose to utilize a different approach to safeguards given their criticism of 
the traditional approach they deemed to be imperialistic. The new national development banks 
employ a country systems approach to safeguards, which entails deference to borrowing country 
legislation and therefore they do not have their own safeguards. This represents a significant shift 
from requiring specific and substantial items to absolutely no requirements for project approval 
and fund disbursement. 
 
At the same time, the stringency of safeguards at multilateral financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and IDB, prevented these entities from taking on environmentally and socially risky 
projects leading to a funding gap. The combination of the funding gap and the emergence of new 
finance actors with no safeguards of their own created a situation in which incredibly harmful 
projects with large risks could go forward thus creating a race to the bottom in large-scale 
infrastructure financing. In particular, national development banks from China and Brazil have 
become the dominant players in development finance in the Amazon due to their ample 
resources and safeguard approach of deference to host country regulations; whereas, the World 
Bank has largely stepped away from large-scale projects in the region due to the high risks 
associated with them.  
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This is evidenced by the case studies of Coca Codo Sinclair and Belo Monte. For both projects, 
multilateral development banks, including IDB and the World Bank, expressed initial interest but 
later refused to finance them once feasibility studies were conducted and the environmental and 
social risks of the projects became obvious. Although the safeguards of the multilateral banks 
worked to prevent the dams from going forward at the time, once the national development 
banks came about, both Ecuador and Brazil were able to secure funding for the projects from 
these new players, CHEXIM and BNDES. Given the total deference approach to safeguard 
employed by these financial institutions, they willingly took on financing for the hydroelectric 
dams despite the substantial environmental and social risks they presented. As stated in the 
section with the case studies, both projects resulted in massive harm to the environment, 
including deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and disruption of river ecology as well as social 
ailments, such as displacement, loss of livelihoods, and health issues. Drawing from the history 
of safeguards as well as the evidence in the case studies, this research concludes that 
environmental and socially harmful hydroelectric dams in the Amazon continue to come about 
despite the evolution of safeguards over the last several decades.  
6.1 Traditional Approach Bests Country Systems Approach 
This research aimed to discover if certain types of safeguard approaches are more effective than 
others at mitigating environmental and social impacts and found that the traditional approach to 
safeguards is more effective than the country systems approach. The traditional approach has an 
extra layer of safeguards mandated from the financial institution itself versus relying just on the 
legislation of the host country. The case studies provide evidence for this. Both the World Bank 
and IDB, which practice the traditional approach, decided not to finance Belo Monte and Coca 
Codo Sinclair due to environmental and social risks inherent in the projects. By having their own 
internal regulations to abide by these multilateral banks were able to rescind their offers to fund 
the dams once issues and risks came to light. In contrast, the national development banks, 
CHEXIM and BNDES, which follow the country systems approach, agreed to finance the 
projects. By strictly deferring to the rules of the borrowing country and not having any of their 
own, these banks supplied financial resources for dams that resulted in devastating 
environmental and social impacts. 
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Even for countries with robust and protective measures related to the environment and people, 
the country systems approach is not sufficient in protecting these groups from project impacts. 
Although Ecuador and Brazil have strong laws regarding the environment and communities, 
especially indigenous peoples, deference to them did not affect the negative outcome of the 
dams. In the case of Belo Monte, when the Brazilian government granted the environmental 
license despite severe concerns with the EIA, BNDES approved its financing for the project. By 
abiding to the country systems approach, all the criticisms with the design of Belo Monte were 
ignored by BNDES which allowed the project to go forward despite its enormous potential for 
devastating impact. Ecuador even gives rights to nature in its constitution and yet Coca Codo 
Sinclair was pushed forward by the government. CHEXIM gave funding to the project because it 
deferred to the Ecuadorian government. But as shown in both cases, even countries with 
protective environmental and social legislation can turn a blind eye to their own rules and when 
this happens there is no extra safeguarding layer within the banks which follow the country 
systems approach. 
6.2 Safeguards Futile Without Implementation 
This research aimed to evaluate the relative importance of two different items at mitigating 
impact: the substance of the safeguard itself or the implementing partner of the safeguard. 
Safeguards can provide critical measures to prevent environmental and social harms related to 
development projects, but without proper implementation they are useless. The Coca Codo 
Sinclair and Belo Monte case studies demonstrate this conclusion. Although CHEXIM and 
BNDES do not have their own safeguards, they both require compliance with host country 
legislation to approve financing and maintain disbursements. However, there were various 
occasions in which the own rules of these countries were not followed. For example, Ecuador 
requires transparency of their projects, but this was not applied throughout the entire process. An 
EIA and environmental license is also required under Ecuadorian law before construction can 
begin, but neither of these had taken place when construction on the road to access the dam’s 
power starvation started. In the case of Belo Monte, the Brazilian government allowed for 
construction to begin with a partial installation license, something that does not exist within 
Brazilian law. They also granted a license even though the conditions of the EIA had not been 
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met. BNDES deferred to the rules of Brazil and did not monitor the compliance of Norte Energia 
in regard to the environmental and social standards. In fact, the bank repeatedly ignored the 
concerns voiced by civil society organizations and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. BNDES stated 
that its only contingency for continuing disbursements was the existence of the environmental 
license and chose to ignore all of the violations surrounding the project. The World Bank and 
IDB pulled out from funding the dam twenty years earlier due to the concerns with indigenous 
peoples, but BNDES was willing to take the risks.   
6.3 National Development Banks Take Over 
The research analyzed the changing role of national development banks and multilateral 
development banks in the Amazon and what this change has resulted in. From the policy analysis 
(chapter four) and the case studies (chapter five), the research concludes that national 
development banks have replaced multilateral development banks in the Amazon with grave 
results for the environment and local communities, due to minimal safeguards and significant 
corruption in the borrowing governments as well as national banks. The World Bank and IDB 
dominated the international development field in the twentieth century, financing large-scale 
projects globally, including many dams. And yet the largest dams ever to be built in the Amazon, 
Coca Codo and Belo Monte, were not financed by these two multilaterals. Belo Monte was 
designed to be the third largest dam in the world and Coca Codo the largest dam in Ecuador. 
Projects of this magnitude would have been prime recipients of multilateral financing in the 
1970s. But with the changing times, the funding gap left by the multilaterals as a result of their 
stringent safeguards has been filled by Chinese and Brazilian national development banks, 
especially CHEXIM and BNDES. These two banks provided the financing for the Coca Codo 
Sinclair and Belo Monte hydroelectric dams, signaling the end of an era and the beginning of a 
new one with stark environmental and social consequences.  
Under the banner of South-South Cooperation, Brazil and China have been critical development 
finance partners for Amazonian countries over the last decade. The infrastructure boom taking 
place in the Amazon currently is a result of financing provided by these new partners. For 
example, six of Ecuador’s eight large hydroelectric dams have received financing from Chinese 
institutions (Vallejo et al. 2018). CHEXIM in particular has become one of the biggest funders of 
 63 
 
large-scale dams and is the world’s largest export credit agency. Similarly, Sinohydro is the 
largest hydropower company in the world (International Rivers 2012). Financial numbers 
provide further evidence of this shift from multilateral funding to national development funding. 
BNDES’ lending in Latin America was more than the lending from the World Bank and IDB 
combined; whereas, CHEXIM and the China Development Bank have become the largest 
lenders in Latin America since 2007 (Gallagher & Yuan 2017). BNDES committed to using over 
half of its investments for infrastructure, especially hydroelectric energy, for three years from 
2011-2014 (Little 2013).  
Brazil and China’s national development banks have given loans for projects that were 
previously rejected due to non-compliance with social and environmental standards by other 
financial institutions. Both countries continue to pursue projects with substantial and devastating 
impacts for the environment and local communities. For example, BNDES approved financing 
for another dam in the Brazilian Amazon, Sao Luiz de Tapajos, which has faced significant 
criticism over the impact it will cause in the region. As a result of this funding shift, more and 
more infrastructure projects in the Amazon are continuing to go forward with financial support 
from Chinese and Brazilian development banks even though the EIAs have demonstrated them 
to be harmful for the environment and surrounding communities. In such a unique and biodiverse 
part of the world, this can only signify large-scale and long-term impact on the ground for both 
the flora and fauna as well as the local inhabitants.  
7. Recommendations 
This research leads to two recommendations related to the development of hydroelectric dams in 
the Amazon and financial institutions. As stated in Section 2.1, the Amazon has the greatest 
biodiversity on the planet, one-fifth of the world’s freshwater, an enormous carbon-absorbing 
capacity, the majority of the world’s last uncontacted indigenous groups, and plays a vital role in 
the region’s climate system. Many of the communities living in the region depend on the health 
of the environment for their livelihoods and subsistence. The Coca Codo Sinclair and Belo 
Monte case studies showed the disastrous impacts the dams inflicted on the surrounding areas 
and local inhabitants. Both projects failed to deliver the promises made by politicians that the 
dams would drastically increase the energy production to benefit the populations and stimulate 
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the economy to benefit the countries’ development. Instead, Coca Codo Sinclair and Belo Monte 
operate at only half their estimated capacity and have resulted in far greater costs, economically, 
environmentally, and socially. Due to the inflated pricing of both projects and the lawsuits and 
fines stemming from the environmental and social destructions they caused, the dams had a 
much higher price tag in the end. Importantly, both case studies showed that corruption is the 
main driver of such ill-conceived and damaging hydroelectric projects in the Amazon. Bribes 
were made to politicians at the highest levels to influence decision-making and move the projects 
forward. Instead of working to fulfill the energy needs of the countries and provide services and 
economic benefits to the communities, the real intent was to generate money for construction 
companies and politicians.  
 
In sum, the evidence from this research indicates that large-scale hydroelectric dams are highly 
destructive in the Amazon and driven mainly by corruption. Given the environmental and social 
disasters from Belo Monte and Coca Codo Sinclair and their inability to achieve their stated 
purposes, these case studies along with other examples, including the Balbina Dam and Tucurui 
Dam, show that: The governments of the Amazonian countries should not develop any more 
large-scale hydroelectric dams in the region. Instead, governments should invest their 
financial and technical resources in two areas: improving the production efficiency of existing 
dams to maximize their energy output and increasing production of solar and wind power to 
meet energy needs of the populations. Additional research beyond these case studies can provide 
more evidence to support this recommendation as well as information regarding the other forms 
of renewable energy. 
 
This research also showed that the multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, 
have already stopped financing such damaging projects due to their safeguards. The policy 
analysis in section 4.1 highlighted the importance of the World Bank’s safeguards in serving to 
reject environmentally and socially risky projects. While this is positive for the development 
finance field, the national development banks have ramped up investments to fill the void left by 
the multilateral development banks. Section 4.3 of the policy analysis demonstrated that the 
national development banks have the weakest safeguards of all financial institutions and the 
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Coca Codo Sinclair and Belo Monte case studies exemplified the dire consequences resulting 
from the lack of safeguards.  
 
The evidence in this research shows that large-scale dams in the Amazon result in disastrous 
environmental and social harms when safeguards are not implemented. The Chinese and 
Brazilian national development banks need to strengthen their current safeguards and 
move beyond relying solely on the borrowing countries’ laws by implementing their own 
rules to mitigate damage. To begin with, they should conduct an independent due diligence 
process to assess the environmental and social risks of the project before agreeing to provide a 
loan. In addition, the banks should create direct and transparent lines of communication with 
project-affected people and the civil society organizations that represent both local communities 
and the environment in order to hear their concerns and be able to address them. In order to 
conduct the due diligence and maintain open and transparent dialogue with civil society, the 
banks need to hire more staff that can focus solely on the environmental and social aspects of the 
projects. With the guidance of these staff members, the bank can put safeguards in place to 
mitigate the impacts associated with the project and avoid costly delays and fines. This approach 
will improve the selection of projects and their sites, increase accountability with the banks and 
result in better outcomes for all those involved.  
 
The national development banks can develop a hybrid approach to this model, similar to the 
World Bank’s safeguards reform in 2016, in order to maintain ties to their preferred approach of 
country systems while reducing the environmental and social impacts of their project 
investments. With borrowing countries that have their own strong legislation regarding the 
environment and local communities, the national development banks can defer to their rules and 
act solely as a watch dog to ensure compliance. Conversely, the national development banks can 
apply their own safeguards for borrowing countries with weak legislation, while also providing 
assistance for the countries to strengthen their rules so that over time these countries can have 
greater autonomy. In this case, the banks should also act a watchdog and in both cases, loans 
should not be approved, and disbursements should not be processed if there is a lack of 
compliance with the law. 
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In order to proceed with this last recommendation, there is a need for civil society organizations 
and surrounding institutions to put the pressure on the banks by finding leverage points as well as 
strengthening the institutions that can protect the environment and communities. These items are 
beyond the scope of this research, but future research can focus on solving this. Although 
tackling corruption and convincing the national development banks to implement safeguards do 
not fall within the objectives of this research, the evidence presented can serve as a foundation 
for future work. The recommendations should be followed up with additional research in order to 
maintain the incredible and unique ecosystem of the Amazon.  
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